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RECENT CASES
Antitrust Law-Restraint of Trade-Supreme Court
Suggests A New Reading of Section 3
of the Clayton Act
The petitioner utility company negotiated a contract with respondent
coal company in which it agreed to purchase all of the coal it required as

fuel at a new generating station for a twenty year period. These requirements were estimated to be 350,000 tons in 1958, increasing thereafter to a

peak of 2,250,000 tons per year. Shortly before the first scheduled delivery,
respondent advised petitioner that the contract was illegal under antitrust
laws and would not be performed. Petitioner brought an action for declaratory judgment on the validity of the contract. Both the district court'

and the Sixth Circuit (2-1),2 agreed that the contract violated section 3 of
the Clayton Act, 3 and was therefore unenforceable.

On certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. 4 There was no substantial lessening of competition because only .777 of the total output of
the coal producers in the relevant market area was encompassed by this
contract 5 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
The Clayton Act was enacted by Congress in response to a bipartisan call
for antitrust reform which stemmed from growing public alarm at the
trend toward concentration. 6 It was intended to supplement and extend
1. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
2. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960).
3. Section 3 of the Clayton Act reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to
lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding
that the lessee or purchaser therof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of . . .
competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale
or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
4. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the basis of the holding in the lower
courts.
5. The respondent also contended that the contract violated sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, but the Court found it unnecessary to discuss that act, stating that
"if [the contract] does not fall within the broader proscription of § 3 of the Clayton
Act it follows that it is not forbidden by the [Sherman Act]." Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 335 (1961).
6. HANLER, ANrrrrusr IN PERspEaCTVE 29-30 (1957).

An example of court atti-

tudes which contributed to the concern and one which pointed to the need for legislation in the area of exclusive dealing is Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed.
454 (8th Cir. 1903), where the court stated that "the right of each competitor to fix
prices of the commodities which he offers for sale, and to dictate the terms upon
617
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the Sherman Act of 1890 and other antitrust legislation. 7 Section 3 of this
statute was aimed at limiting abuses of exclusive dealing arrangements,8
including requirements contracts.9 In the early decisions under this section,

the Supreme Court struck down various exclusive agreements, stressing
therein both the dominant market position of the seller and the market
segment effectively foreclosed to that seller's competitors. 10 Defensive
arguments as to the reasonableness and necessity of these arrangements for
maintenance of customer good will or for protection against other manufacturers were largely unsuccessful."
In recent years, section 3 cases have been more concerned with the
market foreclosure than with the seller's dominance. Indeed, litigation has
been overshadowed by the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States (hereinafter cited as Standard Stations) 12 wherein market
share foreclosure became the primary test for illegality. 13 Under attack
were the defendant's requirements contracts with 16% of the retail outlets
which he will dispose of them, is indispensable to the very existence of competition."
Id. at 459. (Emphasis added.)
7. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922).
S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914), reads as follows: "[T]he bill [the
Clayton Act], in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies, seeks to prohibit
and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in themselves,
are not covered by the act of July 2, 1890 [The Sherman Act], or other existing
antitrust acts, and thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of
trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation ......
For a review of the chain of events in the legislative history of section 3, see Handler,
Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 85-87 (1961).
8. The two basic exclusive dealing arrangements are the tie-in and the requirements
contract. See Note, Exclusive Dealing Arrangements Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 47
VA. L. Rmv. 675 (1961).
9. This arrangement is a contract or agreement whereby a buyer must purchase
substantially all of his requirements of a particular product from one seller, if he is
to be allowed to buy any at all. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949).
10. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922)
(requirements contract); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451
(1922) (tie-in); International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936) (tie-in); Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (requirements contract); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947) (tie-in). But see FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923). For
individual treatment of these cases see Note, supra note 8.
11. In International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, supra note 10, the
Court rejected an argument that a tie-in of tabulating cards with a tabulating machine
was necessary to insure proper results and customer satisfaction, and in Fashion
Originator's Guild of America v. FTC, supra note 10, an argument that requirements
contracts were necessary and reasonable to protect designers of expensive wearing
apparrel from manufacturers who copied the designs and sold them more cheaply was
also rejected.
12. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
13. The Court recognized that the seller did not dominate the market, stating that
"Standard's share of the retail market for gasoline, even including sales through company-owned stations, is hardly large enough to conclude as a matter of law that it
id.
I..."at 302.
occupies a dominant position .
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in a seven state area. 14 Standard's sales accounted for 23%'of the total

gasoline sold in the area,15 6.7% of which was sold through these outlets.' 6

Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter framed the issue as whether
the effect on competition could be shown "simply by proof that a substan-

tial portion of commerce is affected or whether it must also be demonstrated
that competitive activity has actually diminished or probably will diminish." 7 The Court rejected the latter alternative on the theory that such an

inquiry would involve evaluation of economic data for which the Court was
ill-suited. 8 Reviewing past decisions and legislative history, the Court held
"that the qualifying clause of § 3 is satisfied by proof that competition
has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected."'19 This is the rule of "quantitative substantiality"2 0 which says, in effect,
that when competitors are foreclosed from a substantial share of the
market, substantial lessening of competition may be inferred.2 1 The violation of section 3 in the Standard Stations case arose because the contracts

foreclosed competitors from a substantial share of retail sales.2
14. Id. at 295. This was a total of 5,937 independent dealers.
15. Id. at 295.
16. Ibid. This amounted to $57.6 million worth of gasoline in 1947. Evidence
disclosed that during the ten year period in which Standard employed these contracts,
its proportionate sales of gasoline remained unchanged. Id. at 296.
17. Id. at 299.
18. Id. at 310.
19. Id. at 314. A strong critic of Standard Stations, Professor Milton Handler states
that the decision rested on an improper reading of the legislative history of section 3.
It rested on the mistaken idea that both branches of Congress intended an absolute
prohibition of exclusives and only added the qualifying language of section 3 (supra
note 3) as a mere gloss, without significant effect except in de minimis situations,
when, in fact, it was the result of a compromise between opposing views in the House
and Senate. See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YA.LE L.J. 75, 84-87
(1961).
20. See Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE
L.J. 1, 28 (1959) and accompanying note wherein reference is made to a collection of
citations to writings on quantitative substantiality in HANDLER, ANUrrmuST IN PERSPECTIW 136-37, 143 (1957).

21. See Kessler & Stem, supra note 20, at 28. Professor Handler says, "The question
which should have been formulated, and which the Court left unanswered, was
whether the exclusive requirements contracts deprived existing or potential competitors
of reasonable access to available market outlets." HArNa, op. cit. supra note 20, at
34. He feels that the standard formulated by the Court compels illegality in all but
insignificant situations. For his complete analysis of the case see HANDLER, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 33-37, and see note 19 supra. Kessler and Stem, while critical of the
test formulated in Standard Stations, advance the idea that the word "substantial" may
have two meanings. The first is in the sense of "not insignificant," while the second
would intend that there is a substantial, an insubstantial, and a zone in between. If
the latter were the meaning used by the Court, then, even though limits were not
defined, "substantial" in Standard Stations would mean only that market domination is
not necessary for a section 3 violation. The courts in subsequent cases, however, have
not made this distinction. For their analysis of the case see Kessler & Stem, supra
note 20, at 24-37.
22. Notes 14-16 supra. Under the reasoning of Kessler and Stem, the Court did
not base its decision against Standard Oil on the quantitive substantiality test, but
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A decade of confusion and vacillation followed Standard Stations. While
the courts applied the quantitative substantiality test,23 the Federal Trade
Commission rejected it, announcing in 1953 in The Maico Co.2 4 that it had
both the competence and the responsibility to appraise economic data on
the effects of exclusive arrangements on market competition.35 Therefore,
the FTC would not hold section 3 violated merely upon a showing that
competition was substantially foreclosed, but would base decisions only
on the probable market effects.26 This division of opinion led one commentator to observe in 1957 that section 3 liability might depend entirely
27
on whether the proceeding was before the Commission or before a court.
To add to the uncertainty, the Supreme Court in FTC v. Motion Pictures
Advertising Service Co.2 8 implied that the Commission might impose
stricter tests under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act than
under section 3 of the Clayton Act.5 Then in 1960 the FTC reversed itself
by expressly overruling the Maico doctrine and rejecting evidence in the
form of economic data showing competitive or anti-competitive effects
within the relevant market.30 It stated that Standard Stations would be
followed 31
on the collective market foreclosure by major oil companies. Kessler & Stem, supra
note 20, at 30.
23. See Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Dictograph
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955);
Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), reo'd on
other grounds, 346 U.S. 61 (1953); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated
Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
906 (1950); United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Red Rock
Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., 1952 Trade Cas. U 67375 (5th Cir.); cf. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. dcnied, 346
U.S. 901 (1953). In United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn.
1951), the court held section 3 was not violated. The decision was based in part on the
absence of a showing of actual or probable lessening of competition. "But authority
of the case is weakened by the alternative holding that there was a failure of proof
that the defendant actually entered into exclusive agreements as charged. Moreover,
the amount of commerce involved amounted to less than %k of 1 percent, which even
under Standard Stations might be deemed insubstantial." HANDLER, ANTnUST IN
PERsPEcnr.E 38 n.42 (1957).
24. 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
25. Id. at 487-88.
26. Id. at 488.
27. Handler, op. cit. supra note 23, at 39. In fact, the results have generally been
the same. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954); Revlon Prods. Corp.,
51 F.T.C. 260, motion to re-open denied, 51 F.T.C. 466 (1954); Beltone Hearing Aid
Co., 52 F.T.C. 830 (1956); Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956).
28. 334 U.S. 392 (1953).
29. Id. at 394-95. Justice Frankfurter argued against using the quantitative substantiality doctrine in this Sherman Act case in a vigorous dissent which contained
overtones of restricting the doctrine itself.
30. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., TADE IEc. REP. Uf29091, at 37529 (Sept. 28,
1960).
31. Id. at 37530. It would now appear that the FTC was right the first time, but
in Rural Gas Serv., Inc., 3 TRADE BEG. REP. U15515 (Oct. 24, 1961), the commission
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In Tampa Electric, the Court implied that section 3 decisions based
entirely on market share foreclosure were at an end. The Sixth Circuit
had found that the agreement was exclusive, the line of commerce
was coal (not boiler fuels), and that the relevant market area was peninsular Florida. Following Standard Stations, it held that the market share
foreclosed was not "insubstantial,"' 2 and that the agreement was illegal.
The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the contract was an
exclusive dealing arrangement and that coal was the line of commerce, but
it did not agree that peninsular Florida was the proper market area.3
The Court found that "by far the bulk of the overwhelming tonnage
marketed from the same producing area as serves Tampa is sold outside of
Georgia and Florida .... ."m It therefore held the relevant market area to
be the area in which seven hundred coal producers, who were "eager" to
serve Florida, could effectively compete.as From the statistics presented,
the Court found that the maximum estimated consumption by Tampa3: 7 was
less than 1%of the total volume of coal marketed by these suppliers.38
This the Court said, "is conservatively speaking, quite insubstantial."3 9
From this determination of the market area, it would seem to follow that
there was no violation of section 3 even under the strict Standard Stations
doctrine. The Court, however, declined to rest its decision on that case,
going on to say that neither dollar volume foreclosed nor market share
foreclosed would be conclusive. 40 Instead, substantiality would be determined in a given case by weighing
the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of competition, taling into
account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce
involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area,
and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share
of the market might have on effective competition therein . ... 41

Thus, the Court states that the inquiry will go beyond inference from a
showing of substantial market share foreclosure to an appraisal of market
appears to continue to follow Standard Stations when it dismissed a complaint on the
ground that market foreclosure was too small for any inference of competitive injury.
32. 276 F.2d at 772.
33. 365 U.S. at 320, 330-32.
34. Id. at 331. The respondent had contended that the relevant market was Florida
and Georgia "at most."
35. Id. at 331.
36. Id. at 331-32. For a criticism of the market area in the instant case, see The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 l-IAlv. L. REv. 40, 205-08 (1961). See also 39 TEXAS
L. REv. 913 (1961).
37. 2,250,000 tons per year.
38. The Court took notice of the fact that 290,567,000 tons of bituminous coal were
sold on the open market by producers within the relevant market in 1954. 365 U.S. at
332.
39. Id. at 333.
40. Id. at 333-34.
41. Id. at 329.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15,

facts. The Court will delve beneath the surface to consider and weigh the
potential short-run and long-run actual effects on competition. It would
therefore appear that Tampa Electric has displaced the more mechanical
quantitative substantiality test with a flexible standard in accord with the
statute and its legislative history.42
The case, however, leaves grave doubts concerning its status as precedent
for future litigation. As the precursor of a new interpretation of section 3,
it has three major weaknesses. First, as was pointed out above, determination of the relevant market area could have been the controlling factor in
the outcome of the case because even under the Standard Stations rationale,
the market share as defined was not substantial. It could be argued, then,
that language going beyond the quantitative substantiality test was superfluous to the decision.43 Second, the litigation arose from an anticipatory
breach of contract. Section 3 was interposed as a defense by a seller seeking
to avoid his contractual obligation which distinguishes it from the normal
antitrust suit brought by the government or by an injured consumer or
competitor." Such a "collateral" use of antitrust provisions has met with
disfavor in the Supreme Court4 5 and was strenuously attacked in this case
by Judge Weick's dissent in the circuit court.4 6 The Court left this important question unanswered, merely pointing out the problem by footnoting
an earlier case in which it had disallowed a contract defense based on
illegality under the Sherman Act. 47 Would it not have been better, where
such a use of section 3 is involved, at least to invite the FTC into the case,
thus affording the Court the advantage of the data and the experience of
that agency?8 Third, and particularly troublesome, is the fact that the
42. Notes 3, 19 supra. This does not mean that the expanded standard is more
liberal. It has been suggested that the Court would now be free to find a section 3
violation where it found actual anticompetitive effects, though the market share was
not substantial. See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 40, 205 (1961).
43. On the other hand it might be argued that the case is stronger because the Court
was not content to follow Standard Stations, once the market area was determined.
44. It is interesting to note that when the contract was made, Nashville Coal Co.
was owned by the late Justin Potter, who was at that time Tennessee's wealthiest man.
Nashville Coal was probably the eleventh largest coal-mining and sales operation in
the United States. Shortly thereafter, Potter's health failed, and he sold his coal company to Cyrus S. Eaton, one of the nation's richest men. Eaton merged Nashville Coal
with West Kentucky Coal Co., then probably ninth largest in the U.S., in which he
held working control. A recent magazine article indicates that Eaton owned stock in
Tampa Electric Company, and yet, two years later, after large expenditures in
reliance on the contract by both sides, Nashville Coal announced that the contract
would not be performed. Caldwell & Graham, The Strange Romance Between John L.
Lewis and Cyrus Eaton, Harpers, Dec. 1961, p. 25.
45. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959), and review of cases therein.
46. 276 F.2d at 766, 774-77.
47. 365 U.S. at 325.
48. This would be possible under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (2). While a court could
not compel intervention by the FTC, it is felt that the agency would desire to present
arguments on important questions. The agency's declining to intervene could warrant
an inference that no significant public interest was jeopardized.
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Court justified its finding of legality, in part at least, on the ground that the
buyer was a public utility. In answer to a contention that the twenty-year
period of the contract was its principal vice, the Court said: "[B]ut at least
in the case of public utilities the assurance of a steady and ample supply
of fuel is necessary in the public interest."49 The Court then added that this
does not mean that public utilities are immune from Clayton Act violations,50 but in judging substantiality, consideration of the parties' operations
are relevant.5 ' This makes it virtually impossible to discern a consistent
underlying rationale from the case that is helpful in reading section 3.
De-emphasis of quantitative substantiality in favor of a more qualitative
test would be a progressive trend in section 3 litigation, but it is suggested
that the facts of Tampa Electric did not offer a proper foundation for the

pronouncement of such a change.

Civil Rights-Abatement and RevivalState Survival and Wrongful Death Statutes
Adopted in Federal Civil Rights Act Suits
In a recent case in a federal district court in Arkansas plaintiff sought
damages under the federal civil rights statutes.' She alleged that the
49. 365 U.S. at 344.
50. Ibid.
51. Id. at 335.
1. These decisions are, first and foremost, based on statutory construction. Thus,
those portions of the statutes which are applicable are set out below.
REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
RErv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958). "(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws . . .whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators."
RFv. STAT. § 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1958). "Every person who, having
knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985
of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act
be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all
damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence
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police chief of Little Rock had caused her to be illegally arrested, beaten,
and otherwise deprived of her civil rights.2 When the defendant died prior
to trial and plaintiff sought to substitute the administrator as defendant the
administrator moved for dismissal, pointing to the absence of specific provision for survival of causes of action in the civil rights statutes as indicative
of Congress' intent that there would be no survival. In a similar case
brought under the civil rights statutes in a federal district court in Georgia,
five police officers moved for dismissal after the injured party had died and
his wife had filed suit individually and as administratrix. She alleged that
her husband had died from brutal beatings inflicted by the defendants
while he was illegally in their custody. 3 In each case the judge dismissed
the complaint rejecting an interpretation that the statutes implied that the
could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case;
and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined
as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such
wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such
action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit
of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for
the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of
this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the
cause of action has accrued."
REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1958). "The jurisdiction . . . conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter ...for the protection of
all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offences against law, the common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal causes is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty."
Note here that sections 1983 and 1985 concern active malfeasance while section
1986 refers to and provides for sanctions against passive nonfeasance. Note also that
sections 1983 and 1985(3) do not provide for survival of the cause of action or even
mention it while section 1986 specifically provides for survival of the cause of action
to the widow or the estate.
2. Plaintiff alleged that she was, "without warning or provocation, forcibly seized
and taken to jail, beaten, manhandled, and injured. ... denied her constitutional right
to equal protection under the laws, . . .denied her ...right to see and talk with her
attorney ...illegally detained for an unreasonable length of time without charge .. .
subjected to constant and protracted questioning . . .denied the opportunity to give
and post bail immediately upon her request ...all of which actions were . ..caused
by the defendant ...." Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 154 (8th Cir. 1961).
3. Plaintiff, the wife and administratrix of the deceased, alleged in substance: (1)
-that two police officers deprived the deceased of his rights to be secure in his person, to
due process of law, and to equal protection of the law by illegally arresting him and
while in their custody willfully and brutally beating him without cause, (2) that
later all five police officers conspired to deprive the deceased of his rights secured by
the constitution and with intent to discriminate against him, illegally removed him
from jail and beat him so that he died a few days later. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d
401 (5th Cir. 1961).
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cause of action would survive the death of a party. On appeal to the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits, held, reversed and remanded for trial on the merits.

The currently effective state survival and death statutes are adopted as
federal law pursuant to section 1988 of the civil rights statutes in so far
as this is necessary to make the federal civil rights statutes fully effective
in the particular case. Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961).
Brazier v. Cherry,293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961).
The rules of the common law which applied to the instant situations, (1)
that tort actions for personal wrongs abated on the death of either plaintiff
or defendant, and (2) that no action could be founded on the death of a
human being, were at one time universally followed, though they were
severely criticised. 4 All of the states have abrogated these rules by statutes,5
but Congress has never enacted a general wrongful death survival provision. Thus, where the action arises under federal law the question is
necessarily whether Congress, in the particular statute which created the
cause of action or through related statutes, has expressed or implied a
federal right of survival or, absent this, has Congress expressly or by implication indicated that state laws were to be adopted when necessary to fill
any gaps left in the federal law? 6 While the courts in the instant cases did
not have the benefit of any precedent for the adoption of local law to
implement the civil rights statutes,7 such precedent does exist in related
areas of the law such as survival of tort actions under admiralty and under
the Federal Torts Claims Act. 8 Thus, as Judge Brown noted in Brazier v.
4. Psossm, ToRTs § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Ibid.
6. See Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 403-04, 406 (5th Cir. 1961); Pritchard v.
Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 154-55 (8th Cir. 1961).
7. Apparently the question had not been litigated before.
8. See Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960). There an employee of a subcontractor for the government was killed through negligence of another government
employee and the death occurred on the navigable waters of Oregon. An action was
brought in admiralty against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958) which makes the United States liable "for . . . personal
injury or death caused by . . . any employee of the Government . . . under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable ... in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." The law of Oregon
was applied to hold the government liable for the death of its employee. The court
said, "Although admiralty law itself confers no right of action for wrongful death, The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, yet 'where death . . . results from maritime tort committed
on navigable waters within a state whose statutes give a right of action on account of
death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts will entertain a libel in personam for the
damages sustained by those to whom such right is given."' 361 U.S. at 318-19. And
in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), a New Jersey resident went aboard
a ship at the dock, slipped on spilled oil, and fell to his death. Suit was brought in
admiralty to recover damages for his death. No federal survival or wrongful death
provision was available since the deceased had not been a "seaman" so as to come
under the survival provision of the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1958), and was not killed "on the high seas" so as to come under the Death On The
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CherrT, there was no doubt that Congress could have adopted state law as
federal law; 9 the question was: Had Congress done so in regard to causes
of action arising under the civil rights statutes?
Judges Van Oosterhout and Brown, in writing the opinions for the courts
of appeals, used similar lines of reasoning to find that Congress had adopted
the currently effective local survival laws by enacting section 1988 of the
civil rights statutes. Both judges noted (1) that federal law governed the
cause of action and ruled out applicability of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins;1 (2)
that there was no survival at common law, and traced the legislative and
judicial amelioration of the injustice arising from this harsh rule; (3) that
section 1983, while creating the cause of action, did not expressly or impliedly treat the survival issue; and (4) that even in the absence of a
specific provision "federal courts have determined ... the issue of survival,
on the basis of state law."" Section 1988 of the civil rights statutes provides:
[B]ut in all cases where [the laws of the United States] are not adapted to the
object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies ...
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State... shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....

Both courts found that these words expressly authorized resort to state
law' 2 where there was a deficiency or gap in the civil rights statutes. 13 The
High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958). In this case the court
applied the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act as federal law to govern the action. And
in Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), a suit in admiralty to recover damages
for personal injuries aboard tort-feasor's boat on navigable waters within the boundaries
of Florida, where the tort-feasor had died, the court applied the Florida survival
statute in absence of any federal provision. Accord, Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257
U.S. 233 (1921). For more thorough treatment of the developments in this area see
generally Comments, State Wrongful Death Acts and Maritime Torts, 39 TExAs L. REv.
643 (1961), The Application of State Survival Statutes in Maritime Causes, 60 COLUM.
L. REv. 534 (1960).
9. Brazier v. Cherry, supra note 6, at 406: "Without a doubt Congress has the
constitutional power to spell out a comprehensive right of survival for civil rights
claims." "There is, first, nothing unusual about Congress adopting state law of the
several states as federal law." Id. at 407. As an example of this Judge Brown cites
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2)
(1958) which says in part: "To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with this subchapter . . . the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State . . . are
declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the surface soil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf . . . which would be within the area of the
State if its boundaries were extended seaward. .. "
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Since both cases involve questions under federal law and
jurisdiction was not based on diversity of citizenship there was no Erie question involved.
11. Pritchard v. Smith, supra note 6, at 158.
12. Both judges pointed out that Congress as a matter of federal law adopts the
whole common law as modified by the constitution and laws of the state and that
from a federal standpoint there is no substantive-procedural type limitation in such
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Eighth Circuit was unanimous in the view that the Arkansas survival statute

should be regarded as part of the federal law; but the Fifth Circuit court
was divided. The dissent insisted that Congress had limited the cause of
action in section 1983 "'to the party injured' and no one else," and since
the "injured party" was dead there was no cause of action. It is significant
that the phrase "and no one else" was not in the statute. As was noted by
Judge Brown, implying such a phrase "defies history"'14 and while not

necessarily illogical is neither compelled by logic nor commended by its
just results. Having thus rejected the dissent Judge Brown went on to

hold that both the survival and death statutes of Georgia became part of
the federal statute because they were regarded as "needed in the particular

case under scrutiny to make the civil rights statutes fully effective." 5
Since in the Pritchard case the "injured party" was bringing the suit,
Congress clearly intended that plaintiff have a cause of action under sectior
adoptive legislation. They further pointed out that the terms of section 1988 were
such that a limitation in the adoption to mere procedure would be "doctrinaire."
13. Both courts cited Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1955), to show the
tendency of the courts to find survival even if the strict terms of statutes, literally
applied, would result in its denial. Judge Brown noted here "this rigor of the common
law 'flies in the face of the express congressional purpose to provide for' protection of
citizens against unconstitutional deprivations of their fundamental civil rights. The
Court's awareness there that 'liberal application of the words of F.E.L.A. would result
in denial of recovery against the personal representative of the tortfeasor' was not permitted to 'frustrate the congressional purpose.' Nor should it here." Brazier v.
Cherry, supra note 6, at 406. In that case a seaman had been killed on the high seas
so as to give his estate a cause of action under the Jones Act but the shipowner died
prior to trial and admiralty did not provide specifically for survival in case of death
of the tort-feasor. The Jones Act referred the rights of the seaman to the Federal
Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958). This statute referring to rights
of railroad employees against railroads had no need for a survival provision with reference to the tort-feasor's death and had none expressly. The court chose to construe
the statute very liberally so as to find that Congress intended that the cause of action
should survive the death of the tort-feasor.
14. Judge Brown in Brazier v. Cherry, supra note 6, at 404, quoting from SEC v.
C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), says: "'Some rules of statutory
construction come down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative
process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of an act to its
narrowest permissible compass. However well these rules may serve at times to aid
in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general
purpose . . . so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative
policy." And "it defies history to conclude that Congress purposely meant to assure
to the living freedom from such unconstitutional deprivations, but that, with like
precision, it meant to withdraw the protection of civil rights statutes against the peril
of death .

. .

. Violent injury that would kill was not less prohibited than violence

which would cripple."
15. "Thus § 1988 declares a simple, direct, abreviated test: what is needed in the
particular case under scrutiny to make the civil rights statutes fully effective? The
answer to that inquiry is then matched against (a) federal law and if it is found
wanting the court must look to (b) state law currently in effect. To whatever extent
(b) helps, it is automatically available, not because it is procedure rather than substance, but because Congress says so." Brazier v. Cherry, supra note 6, at 409.
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1983. That Congress intended to allow this cause of action to be defeated
arbitrarily by the defendant's death without any reference to the substantive
merits seems unreasonable. It is difficult to visualize any situation more
appropriate to the adoption of state law under section 1988 than survival.
In the Brazier case, however, there were two logical, yet diametrically
opposed viewpoints, the reasoning of either of which could have justified
a decision in its favor. On one extreme the dissent favored a very strict
statutory construction giving only that effect which the authors expressly
manifested at the time of enactment. 16 Thus with ancient legislative intent,
the statute, and the trial record as a frame of reference the appellate judge
is to make his decision without considering the practical merits of such a
decision in the present. The opinion of Judge Brown, on the other hand,
seems to recognize the role which the judiciary has played in the past and
will play in the future if our system of law is to continue to be dynamic
and to meet the ever-changing needs and demands of our people. This
view considers each and every relevant factor, giving each its proper weight
before reaching a decision. It is submitted that a close analysis of these
statutes, with a pragmatic viewing of their history and of modem congressional and Supreme Court policies, 17 could not lead to a more logical
decision than that reached by these two courts.

Constitutional Law-Tenth Amendment-the Estate
of A Veteran Dying Intestate Without Heirs May
Constitutionally Escheat to the Federal Rather
Than State Government
A veteran of the armed forces died intestate and without heirs in a
Veterans' Administration hospital in Oregon. He left an estate consisting
of approximately $1,000 in unexpended pension funds and $13,000 which he
had inherited just before his death. This latter portion of the estate was
claimed by Oregon under its escheat laws,' and by the United States under
a federal statute which provides that if a veteran dies intestate without heirs
while in a Veterans' Administration facility, his estate shall vest in the
United States as trustee for such facility.2 The probate court interpreted the
16. Brazier v. Cherry, supra note 6, at 410 (De Vane, J., dissenting). And see Judge
Brown's words referring to the dissent in note 14 supra.
17. See these policies as set out in the opinions in the instant cases.
1. "Immediately upon the death of any person who dies intestate without heirs,
leaving any real, personal or mixed property, interest or estate in this state, the same
escheats to and vests in the state .. " OnE. REv. STAT. § 120.010 (1957).
2. The pertinent part of the statute is as follows: "Whenever any veteran (admitted
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federal statute as requiring a contract between the veteran and the Government, and, since the deceased had been mentally incompetent when
admitted to the hospital, there could not have been a valid contract.
Therefore the statute was not applicable, and deceased's property escheated
to the state. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed this decision on the
same reasoning, and added that the statute must require a contract so as
not to violate the tenth amendment. 3 On appeal to the Supreme Court of
the United States, held, reversed. 4 The statute does not require a contract,
and being necessary and proper to the power to raise and maintain an
army and navy, it does not violate the tenth amendment. United States v.

Oregon,366 U.S. 643 (1961).
With this case, the tenth amendment is once again interjected into the

problematic area of federal-state relations 5 The Articles of Confederation

had provided that the states retained all powers not expressly delegated

to the federal government, 6 but the word "expressly" was not included in
the tenth amendment. 7 Perceiving the significance of this omission, attempts

were made to have "expressly" inserted.8 Although, obviously, these attempts failed, the matter was not settled and conflicting views came forth
immediately. 9 One view saw the Constitution as granting only expressly
as a veteran) shall die while a member or patient in any facility, or any hospital while
being furnished care or treatment therein by the Veterans' Administration, and shall
not leave surviving him any spouse, next of kin, or heirs entitled, under the laws of his
domicile, to his personal property as to which he dies intestate, all such property,
including money and choses in action, owned by him at the time of death and not
disposed of by will or otherwise, shall immediately vest in and become the property
of the United States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post
Fund .... ." 38 U.S.C. § 5220(a) (1958). The state of Oregon did not claim that
portion of deceased's estate which consisted of unexpended pension funds, recognizing
that that part of the estate vested in the United States under another statute, 38
U.S.C. § 3202(e) (1958). It might also be noted that the statute in question applies
only to personal property.
3. In re Warpouske's Estate, 222 Ore. 40, 352 P.2d 539 (1960).
4. Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion; Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by
Mr. Justice Whittaker, dissented.
5. "The whole controversy over the proper activities of the national government
rests upon the Tenth Amendment." Briggs, State Rights, 10 IowA L. BuLL. 297, 299

(1925).
6. "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled." Articles of Confederation, art. II. For an
exhaustive treatment of the Articles of Confederation, see JENSEN, ThE AnTacLEs OF
CONFEDERATION (1948).
7. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
8. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 767-68 (1789). This is discussed in 1 CaossKEY, PorIcs
AND THE CONsTrrurboN 680-90 (1953).
9. One of the first such clashes occurred between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander
Hamilton when the latter proposed his plan for a national bank. "Jefferson-speaking
for all believers in states rights as against national rights . . . objected. He sent
Washington a strong argument. The Constitution, he declared, expressly enumerated
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enumerated powers with the tenth amendment operating as an independent
limitation upon these powers. Opposing this interpretation were those who
held the Constitution to give broadly implied powers upon which the tenth
amendment did not act independently as a limitation.10 The latter view
was accepted and promulgated by Chief Justice John Marshall when the
issue came before the Supreme Court." In his classic rhetoric, Marshall
emphasized the necessity of implied powers and pointed to the omission
of "expressly" in the tenth amendment.' 2 For Marshall, the tenth amendment was only declarative and did not limit a legislative enactment which
could be related to a constitutional grant of power, even if the act entered
a field previously dominated by state power. 13 This view, that federal and
state powers were flexible and cooperative, prevailed on the Court until
Marshall's death in 1835. Following further changes in the Court's perall the powers belonging to the Federal government and reserves all other powers to the
states; and it nowhere says that the Federal government may set up a bank. This
seemed good logic. Washington was on the point of vetoing the bill. But Hamilton
submitted a more convincing argument. He pointed out that all the powers of the
national government could not be set down in explicit detail. A vast body of powers
had to be implied by general clauses, and one of these authorized Congress to 'make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper' for carrying out other powers granted.
Washington accepted this argument and signed Hamilton's measure." NEviNs & ComMAGER,

A PocET

HIsTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

138-39 (1960).

10. This latter approach was best represented by Alexander Hamilton, see note 9
supra, and has come to be known, properly enough, as the Hamiltonian view. Its
counterpart was perhaps best represented by Thomas Jefferson, see note 9 supra, but
has, over the years, come to be known as the Madisonian view. This is not altogether
inappropriate. Madison, for example, wrote: "The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." THE FzmDRAL1ST No.
45, at 303 (Modem Library ed. 1940). However, it is interesting to note that in the
first Congress, when it was proposed that "expressly" be inserted in the tenth amendment, Madison voted against the proposal. 1 ANNsrAS oF CoN. 767-68 (1789). For a
discussion of the Madisonian and Hamiltonian views, see Casto, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 227 (1949).
11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In this case, Marshall
"dealt with the old question of the implied powers of the government under the
Constitution. Here he stood boldly forth in defense of the Hamiltonian theory that the
Constitution by implication gives to the government powers which it did not expressly
state." NEvINE & COMM&AGER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 160.
12. "But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted
shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th amendment, which was
framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited,
omits the word 'expressly,' and declares only that the powers 'not delegated to the
United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people;'
thus leaving the question, whether the particular power may become the subject of
contest, has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to
depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument." McCulloch v. Maryland, supra
note 11, at 406.
13. The principal cases which reveal Marshall's philosophy on the whole matter are
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. ((
Wheat.) 264 (1821); MeCulloch v. Maryland, supranote 11.
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sonnel, 14 new constitutional interpretations emerged. 15 Chief Justice Taney,

who replaced Marshall, envisioned a competitive rather than cooperative
concept 16 of the federal and state powers. He distinguished between them,
making each independent of the other.17 By doing this, the state power

became supreme in its sphere and could not be touched even by expressly
granted powers. This proposition was effectuated by making the tenth

amendment both a symbol of state power and an independent limitation
upon federal power. 18 The tenth amendment became such a shibboleth

that the Court would finally say the federal government is one of enumerated powers. 19 Then, with the depression in the early 1930's came dis-

rupting socioeconomic conditions which prompted legislation giving
stronger powers to the federal government. But this early New Deal
legislation was continually struck down by the Court, relying in part on
the tenth amendment.20 Following the 1936 election and the court-packing
plan, a change became noticeable in the Court's attitude,2 1 culminating, in
14. "Marshall died July 1835, and a few months later the Court was enlarged from
seven justices to nine, a measure which enabled the appointing power of the day to
water down the little that remained of his influence on the bench. Within twenty-two
months the Court received a new Chief Justice and five new Associate Justices, and
a new set of constitutional dogmas .... . CORWIN, CoURT OVER CONSTITUTION 102

(1938).
15. "While the Federalist judges, led by Chief Justice Marshall, were still on the
bench, Hamilton's theories held sway; but as the personnel of the courts changed,
Madisonian principles came to the fore." Cowen, What Is Left of the Tenth Amendnent, 39 N.C.L. 1rEv. 154, 157 (1961). Some of the early cases first indicating
the change were New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); License Cases, 46
U.S. (5How.) 504 (1847).
16. These phrases are Professor Corwin's. See UNIrm STATES CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED at xiv (Corwin ed. 1953).
17. Taney explicitly stated his view thusly: "And the powers of the General Government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of
each other, within their respective spheres." Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.)

506, 516 (1858).
18. "[F]or approximately a century, from the death of Marshall until 1937, the
Tenth Amendment was frequently invoked to curtail powers expressly granted to
Congress, notably the powers to regulate interstate commerce, to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, and to levy and collect taxes." CoRWIN, Thr CONSTITUTION AND WHAT
IT MEANS TODAY 232 (11th ed. 1954).
19. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 635 (1882).
20. The Court declared unconstitutional the National Industrial Recovery Act,
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). For a lively account of
the Supreme Court and the Roosevelt administration during 1935-36, see ScrLsINGaR,
TAE PoLrrrcs OF UPIEAVAL 447-96 (1960).
21. The Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and the Social Security Act, Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). In these
two cases the dissent is predicated on the tenth amendment. In fact, in the Helvering
case, the entire dissent is: "Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler are of
opinion that the provisions of the act here challenged are repugnant to the Tenth
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regard to the tenth amendment, in United States v. Darby2 wherein the
Court expressly returned to Marshall's position, saying: "The [tenth]
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been

surrendered."2 3 Thus, once again, the tenth amendment simply declares the
relationship between the federal and state powers and does not have any

inherent force to act independently as a limitation upon the federal government as long as the latter is legislating pursuant to the Constitution.

Darby has been followed consistently and prevails today.24 But, the idea
that the tenth amendment "states but a truism" does not lead to the conclusion that state power, in its relation to federal, has been rendered impotent. The Court takes cognizance of essentially local activities25 and considers this dominantly local character when interpreting legislation which
forces the Court to draw lines between federal and state administration.26 As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter expressed it: "Federal legislation.., cannot therefore be construed without regard to the implications of our dual system of
government."27 And the return to the principles of Marshall in construing

Amendment." 301 U.S. at 646. These dissents indicate that the Court did not, between
1936 and 1937, undergo a sudden, complete reversal. Prior to this time there had
been strong dissenting opinions in many of the cases with which we are concerned.
E.g., Justices Holmes, Brandeis, McKenna, and Clarke dissented in Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra note 19; Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone dissented in United States
v. Butler, supra note 20, and in United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
Similarly, there were four dissenting Justices in the two important decisions after the
change. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 21; Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, supra note 21.
22. 312 U.S. 10O (1941).
23. Id. at 124. The quotation continues: "There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before
the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not
be able to exercise fully their reserved powers." Ibid.
24. Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92 (1946); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips
v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
25. "We must be alert, therefore, not to absorb by adjudication essentially local
activities that Congress did not see fit to take over by legislation." 10 East 40th St.
Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1945).
26. "Perhaps in no domain of public law are general propositions less helpful and
indeed more mischievous than where boundaries must be drawn, under a federal
enactment, between what it has taken over for administration by the central Government and what it has left to the States. . . . The real question is how the lines are
to be drawn-what are the relevant considerations in placing the line here rather than
there." A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520, 523 (1942). In this
same case, in discussing the phrase "'necessary' to the production of goods for commerce," it was said: "'Necessary' is colored by the context not only of the terms of
this legislation but of its implications in the relation between state and national authority." Id. at 525.
27. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, supra note 26, at 520. It might be noted that
Justice Frankfurter also wrote the majority opinion in 10 East 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v.
Callus, supra note 25. And see his opinions in Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S.
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the tenth amendment does not destroy this duality.
In this case, the Supreme Court said the federal statute in question
was necessary and proper to the power to raise and maintain an army and
thus did not violate the tenth amendment. 2 9 The majority opinion treats
the constitutional issue in a single, brief paragraph, but it is vigorously
taken up in Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion. The tone of the dissent
is struck in its second sentence: "The succession of real and personal
property is traditionally a state matter under our federal system."30 Certain
acts regarding veterans (e.g., the establishment of hospitals, payment of
pensions) are within the scope of the necessary and proper clause, but
administration of veterans' estates is an inexplicable extension of this grant
of power. 31 And the Court had recently warned against too great an
expansion of the necessary and proper clause. 32 The dissent implies that
the majority opinion failed to establish a sufficient relationship between
the statute and the necessary and proper clause to justify the invasion of an
area historically reserved to the states, and embedded in the tenth amend33
ment.
The decision in the instant case would seem to be in accord with the
Court's prevailing view of governmental power and its relation to the tenth
amendment.34 And the result is an equitable one; the deceased probably
would have preferred his estate to go to the Post Fund, rather than to the
state in which the hospital happened to be located. 35 But this case is not to
310 (1960) (majority opinion); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
28. This comment is limited to the constitutional issue involved. As for the federal
statute, the Supreme Court was construing it for the first time, and held that it did
not require a contract between the veteran and the Government. Therefore, in the
case of a veteran incompetent to enter a contract, as here, the statute operates automatically to vest his estate in the United States. The predecessor of the statute in
question was passed in 1910, and expressly sounded in contract. Act of June 25, 1910,
ch. 384, 36 Stat. 736. The statute was amended in 1941 and much of the contractual
language was deleted. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5220-21 (1958). It is the conspicuous absence of
express contractual terms in the 1941 act which leads the Court to conclude that the
requirement of a contract has been eliminated. 366 U.S. at 646. For other cases applying the statute, see In re Skriziszouski's Estate, 382 Pa. 634, 116 A.2d 841 (1955);
In re Consky's Estate, 79 N.D. 123, 55 N.W.2d 60 (1952); In re Bonnet's Estate, 192
Misc. 753, 80 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sur. Ct. 1948). If the veteran is mentally competent
when he enters the hospital, his signing of the application form constitutes a contract,
and there is no problem. See United States v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 130 F. Supp.
521 (S.D. Cal. 1955); United States v. Mid City Nat'l Bank, 121 F. Supp. 402 (N.D.
Ill.
1953); In re Turner's Estate, 171 Cal. App. 2d 591, 341 P.2d 376 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959); In re Witte's Estate, 174 Kan. 360, 255 P.2d 1039 (1953).
29. 366 U.S. at 648-49.
30. Id. at 649.
31. Id. at 651.
32. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
33. 366 U.S. at 654.
34. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
35. The sentiment behind the act was perhaps best expressed by Representative
Jennings during the House discussion of the bill: "And would it not be much better to
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be so easily resolved. The devolution of property is admittedly an area
xeserved to the states; 6 and this statute obviously encroaches on it. But, at
the same time, state power is not absolute in this area. For example, a
state's inheritance laws must yield before a treaty.37 Thus, since Congress
has the authority to provide veterans with hospital facilities and other
benefits, it can be argued that this carries with it the right to legislate on
the whole matter. And if this statute is a means appropriate to that end,
the tenth amendment will not stand in the way. This falls into line with
the view expressed in Darby and followed since that time. This view,
especially in modem times, is a sounder, more flexible interpretation, and
makes the Constitution more adaptable to the public interest in a dynamic
society. Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not develop this point;
instead, the constitutional issue is dismissed in a single paragraph. 38 Recently there has been criticism of the Court's inclination toward assertive or
declarative opinions, opinions which do not have a deliberated exposition
of the rationale. 39 This, of course, is the Court's prerogative, but, because
the devolution of property is of symbolic and historic significance, and
traditionally has been reserved to the states, it is regrettable that the Court
did not elucidate the constitutional problems involved in its decision.

Due Process of Law-A State May Deny An
Applicant Admission to the Bar for Refusing To
Answer Questions About His Advocacy of
Subversive Organizations Or Objectives
In two recent decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, applicants were denied admission to a state bar for refusing to answer questions concerning their possible Communist Party membership.
In neither case was self-incrimination an issue and only in the California
case was there even slight evidence that the applicant had ever participated
in any subversive or questionable activity. The bar committee in both
cases refused to certify the applicants on the narrow ground that their
let that money go into a fund that would inure to the benefit of other veterans than
to . . . let it go into a fund under the escheat laws of that state." 87 CONG. Rrc.
5203-04 (1941).
36. See Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493 (1850).
37. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961), See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
38. 366 U.S. at 648-49.
39. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1957); Lewis, Explanation,Please, The New Republic,
Dec. 4, 1961, p. 9.
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refusal to answer questions had obstructed a full investigation into their
good moral character, general fitness to practice law, and good citizenship.
The applicants protested that they were privileged not to answer because
the committees' questions violated their freedom of speech and association
and that a denial of the right to practice law because of their refusal to
answer these questions was arbitrary, unreasonable state action in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The supreme
court of each state upheld its committee's decision.' In the Supreme Court
of the United States, held, affirmed. Questions concerning possible membership in subversive organizations or advocacy of violent overthrow are
relevant and material in an investigation to determine fitness to practice
law, and it is not a violation of due process or freedom of speech and
association to deny an applicant admission to the bar for refusing to answer
such questions. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
The constitutionally permissible scope of state inquiry into an individual's
past activities or present beliefs and the use which a state may make of the
results of the inquiry in affecting the individual's interests are, of course,
questions of due process under the fourteenth amendment. In attempting
to prevent "arbitrary" action by a state and yet recognizing that state action
can and must at times impinge upon individual interests, it has become
necessary for the Court to devise some test by which these two factors can
be applied to concrete situations. The "clear and present danger" test was
the first one adopted by the Court to determine when the need for protection of morals and orderly society justified governmental invasion of the
need for individual freedom of expression. 2 Imminent danger created by
the words used was the prerequisite to the constitutional prohibition of
speech and assembly. Currently a "balancing test" is used by the Court
which attempts to weigh the interests of the state against that of the individual without the requirement of imminent danger. Under this test, as
the social value of the state action increases, e.g., self-preservation from
subversion, 3 greater incursions into the private affairs of the individual
1. 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959). 52 Cal. 2d 769, 344 P.2d 777 (1959).
2. The "clear and present danger" test, as found in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941), presents the issue of whether the words used are used under such circumstances and are of such nature as to create the substantial evils which Congress
and the state have a right to prevent. It is necessary that the evil be substantial and
the threat highly imminent. For other cases dealing with this test see Whitney v.

California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(a probable rather than imminent danger is sufficient). In the case of Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1942) it was held that this test applied only to those freedoms
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments; therefore writings, speech, or
activity which are obscene or libelous will be immediately subject to censure.
3. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382- (1950) (National
Labor Relations Act provision imposing restrictions on and denial of benefits to any
labor organization failing to file the prescribed anti-communist affidavit held valid);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (although recognizing that the first
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appear reasonable and not arbitrary. In the area of state investigations

into the fitness of an individual to have some license, hold a public job,
,or obtain some other limited benefit, two groups of cases appear. In one
:group, although the state's interest in the subject-matter of the questions
asked is sufficient to justify examining an individual, the answer obtained
may have such little probative value respecting his fitness that to deny him
-the benefit sought because of his answer is unreasonable and arbitrary.
Tlhus admitted past membership in the Communist Party, use of aliases, and
arrests were held insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference of present
-bad moral character which would deny bar admission to an applicant who
had presented strong favorable evidence. 4 In the other cases, the question
itself may be so unrelated to any legitimate state interest, regardless of
the individual's answer, that it is arbitrary even to ask the question or to
-deny any benefit sought because of a refusal to answer or to penalize the
individual for failure to cooperate. The names of NAACP members, for
example, have been held to have "no relevant correlation"5 to the right to
.engage in intrastate commerce6 or to gain a city license, 7 and questions
based on these asserted interests have been struck down. But, where the
subject-matter of the investigation has been the extent of subversive activity
generally 8 or in public education,9 the names of associates have been conamendment protects an individual from compulsory disclosure, the Court limited the
scope of its protection by holding that govenmental interest in the Communist Party
outweighed the individual interest in privacy).
4. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). In its earlier
-Konigsberg decision, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), the Court held that the examining committee could not constitutionally infer from the petitioner's refusal to answer questions
-that he had failed to show that he had a good moral character or that he did not advocate violent overthrow of the government. The bar committee in the Anastaplo case
-did not infer from the petitioner's refusals that he had a bad moral character, but stated
that he had obstructed a full investigation of his fitness and character which resulted
in his failure to meet the burden of establishing them. See 31 Miss. L.J. 303 (1959).
5. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
6. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (contempt con-viction for plaintiff's failure to produce a membership list of a local chapter under
statute ascertaining qualifications to conduct intrastate business held invalid). See
also 46 VA. L. REv. 730 (1950); 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 390, 397 (1959).
7. See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (compulsory disclosure of NAACP
chapter membership list under city occupational license tax ordinance held unconstitutional). See also Note, 27 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 653 (1959); Reference, 4 RACE RL..
L. REP. 207, 224-36 (1959).
8. Compare Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (a contempt conviction for
xefusal to produce the list of persons attending a political discussion camp held valid)
-and Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (contempt conviction for refusal
to disclose to the House Committee on Un-American Activities whether certain persons
.had been members of the Communist Party was held invalid where a clear delegation
of authority from Congress to ask such questions was absent), with Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (the use of contempt power to convict a person for
xefusing to identify the members of the Progressive Party held invalid because that
organization was merely unpopular, not subversive). See 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67,
75-85 (1960).
9. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Pub.
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sidered relevant and unprivileged. Similarly, although mere membership
in any religious organization is not a valid basis for exclusion from the
legal profession, a state may validly question whether an applicant can in
.good faith take the required oath to support the state constitution. If he
cannot do so because of religious scruples, a denial of bar admission has
been held not to be unreasonable. 10 The Court has ruled that membership
in the Communist Party is not unrelated to the use of limited powers for
illegal purposes." Therefore any question regarding membership therein
would be substantially related to the fitness of those entrusted with the
power of our legal system. 12 Likewise, a denial of bar admission based
upon the answer received to such questions would be reasonable if it prevented a full investigation into the extent of an applicant's participation in
that organization.
An adamant minority of the Court has consistently maintained that re:gardless of the relevance of a question, past expressions of one's political or
social ideas and related associations may not be inquired into because such
activity is protected, and silence about it privileged, under freedom of
speech as stated in the first and incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. To these Justices, the possibility of future investigation will itself
have a direct and substantial deterrent effect upon free communication
equivalent to prior restraint.' 3 So viewed, no balance of interests should
Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (state's interest in determining the qualifications of teachers
in public schools including political beliefs outweighs the deterrent effect upon freedom
of speech and association caused by compulsory disclosure). But see Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (dismissal of professor for refusal to answer
committee questions by invoking the fifth amendment held invalid).
10. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (applicant's religious scruples would
not permit him to use firearms in time of war as required by the state constitution).
But of. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). The bar committee in the Anastaplo
case asserted its right to inquire into the applicant's belief in a Supreme Being. He
refused to answer saying that the subject was constitutionally protected. Subsequently
the committee repudiated its right to ask this question and did not base its decision on
his refusal to answer. 366 U.S. at 102-03.
11. See Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
12. The court-made rule in the Konigsberg case was based upon CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6064.1 which forbids certification to practice of anyone who advocates violent
overthrow of the government. In the Anastaplo case the materiality of the question
stemmed from its bearing upon the public interest in having lawyers who observe
orderly processes of change. The court-made rule for exclusion therein was justified
on the need for a full investigation of candidates, as found in In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill.
2d at 480, 121 N.E.2d at 831.
13. Prior restraint herein means official restraint of communication before actual
publication. It, of course, does not mean that the Constitution protects every written
or spoken word or activity, but it does prevent previous restraint upon publication.
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)
(a statutory requirement that one register with a designated official before making a
public speech for support of a lawful organization held invalid); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (state statute punishing utterances advocating violent overthrow
of the government held valid). See also Ernst & Katz, Speech: Public and Private, 53
COLUm. L. REv. 620 (1953).
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be struck against freedom of speech and association short of the "clear and
present danger" point.
The majority of the Court, in both instant cases, by predicating their
decision upon the theory that first amendment freedoms are not "absolutes,"14 proceed to validate the states' action herein on the ground that
the exclusion imposed and the questions asked did not directly control the
content of speech itself. The incidentally limiting effect upon freedom of
association caused by these questions was found to be "outweighed" by
the state's interest in having only lawyers "who are devoted to the law in its
broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its
procedures for orderly change
.'5 Since the hearings were privately
conducted, subject to judicial review, 16 and the applicants had been warned
about the consequences following a refusal to answer, 17 the majority of
the Court thought that the state would have no opportunity to impose
arbitrary restrictions on an applicant. The minority, however, thought the
unequivocal command of the first amendment forbade the creation of tests
under which speech or association might be subjected to compulsory disclosure. Mr. Justice Black thought that the speech involved in these caseswholly related to conflicting ideas about governmental affairs and policiesclearly fell within the type of speech protected under any construction of
the first amendment. 18 He therefore decried the use of the "balancing test"
which under these facts would permit a state directly to abridge rather
than minimally limit the unfettered exercise of these freedoms. Since the
committees refused to certify these applicants even though there was little
or no evidence presented adverse to them, 19 the states' adoption of their
14. The majority of the Court notes two ways in which constitutionally protected
speech is narrower than unlimited license to speak. 366 U.S. at 50-51. One way exists
where general regulatory statutes, not directly controlling the content of speech,
incidentally limit its free exercise. Under such statutes the amount of deterrence has
been justified by a subordinating governmental interest. This theory is applied by the
majority in the instant cases. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (city
ordinance prohibiting operation of sound truck on public streets held valid).
15. 366 U.S. at 52.
16. In California and other states, bar interrogations are conducted in private and
an applicant denied admission to the bar has the right to review of his case, including
review by the United States Supreme Court. But, as pointed out by the minority,
there is little assurance of privacy if an applicant should take his case before any
court.
17. The majority thought that it was of vital importance that the applicants be
forewarned of the consequences of a refusal to answer these questions. Without such
process the state would have an opportunity to impose discriminatory consequences
upon an applicant. 366 U.S. at 44-49, 90-94.
18. The minority seems to think that any compulsory disclosure of speech or association will cause an unconstitutional infringement upon personal freedoms. See Black,
The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. RE~v. 865, 880 (1960).
19. In the Konigsberg case there was some evidence arguably adverse to the
petitioner. 366 U.S. at 59 n.8. In the Anastaplo case there was a complete lack of
adverse evidence, but the question as to his possible Communist Party membership
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procedural rules ° here forced an applicant to prove affirmatively his good
moral character and lack of forbidden advocacy-a practice which had

earlier been held violative of due process and an unconstitutional deterxence of free speech. 2 '
The two instant cases permit compulsory disclosure of speech and association which is both reasonable and necessary to uphold the integrity of
the Bar as a "profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of
this country's legal and political institutions."22 A state could reasonably
conclude that those who refuse to answer whether they are presently members of a political organization dedicated to the destruction of law and
order should not be allowed into the professionP3 As one can easily see,
however, the precise nature of the right herein claimed is neither easily
defined nor neatly fitted under the ubiquitous shield of due process or of
the terms of the first amendment. Although the Court has recognized the
existence of the rights to freedom of association and silence or anonymity
in communication,2 4 the more important factor-the scope of protection to
be accorded them in various situations-is not clearly defined and depends
upon the individual evaluations of the members of the Court. As recognized
by the minority, "This [misapplication of the original balancing test]25 is,
-was presented when the petitioner showed his belief in the "right of revolution" as
presented in the Declaration of Independence. See 366 U.S. at 99 n.2, 113 n.10.
20. The burden of demonstrating fitness and good moral character is normally placed
upon applicants for bar admission. All fifty states have required qualifications for
bar admission including nonadvocacy of violent overthrow of the government and
satisfactory moral character. See WEST PUBIsHING Co., RuL.s Fon ADaISSON TO THE
BAR (35th ed. 1957); Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20
FoR DLm L. REV. 305 (1951). In the Konigsberg case the Court compared these rules
with FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b), which provides that refusal to answer a relevant question
after due warning may be considered as being answered in an unfavorable manner to
the refusing party. 366 U.S. at 44-45.
21. The dissenting Justices think that the consequences of these decisions upon
applicants for the bar will be more severe than a mere tax penalty as found in Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), wherein a state procedural rule requiring veterans to
bear the burden of proving affirmatively a lack of criminal advocacy of violent overthrow was held invalid. The majority distinguishes that case on the ground that in these
,cases there is no intent to penalize political beliefs. The minority, however, thinks that
these rules and decisions will serve "to force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly
orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals .....
366 U.S. at 115-16.
22. 366 U.S. at 52.
23. The license to practice law has generally been considered a privilege granted
by the state and not a right guaranteed under the Constitution. Therefore a state does
not have to grant such license or privilege to all who apply. See Braverman v. Bar
Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1956) (disbarment of lawyer upheld when based
upon conviction of conspiracy to violate the Smith Act; a crime involving moral
turpitude).
24. See 36 IND. L.J. 306 (1961); 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961); 14 VArND. L. 1Ev. 392

<1960).
25. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the minority, thought that the "balancing test,"
as originally conceived, required not only consideration of governmental and individual
interests generally, but consideration of the wisdom of those policies under the facts
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of course, an ever-present danger of the 'balancing test' for the application
of such a test is necessarily tied to the emphasis particular judges give to.
competing societal values."2 6 The variable nature of this test, coupled with
the duty of law applicants to answer truthfully questions asked by the
examining committee,2 7 leaves those who desire to practice law with little
or no certainty as to what areas of his personal history will be beyond theinvestigator's grasp. Any present attempt to determine how the balance,
will be struck regarding the comparison of future govenmental interests
with fundamental individual interests would, of course, be unnecessary and.
impractical.2 8 It would seem important that some reasonable standard be
set up by which the courts, applicants and examining committees could
understand in advance what aspects of a person's political, religious, fraternal or other societal beliefs and organizational memberships will be
substantially related to one's fitness for the legal profession or other positions of public trust.

Federal Courts-State Security for Expenses Statute
Inapplicable in Federal Equity Action Under
Securities Exchange Act
The plaintiffs, holders of 1.1% of the corporate stock of Borne Chemical
Company, brought a stockholders' derivative action in a federal district
court in Pennsylvania under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.1 It was alleged that the defendants violated this federal act by
the fraudulent sale of 10,000 shares of the company's capital stock. The
defendants moved to require the plaintiffs to post security for expenses,
including reasonable attorney's fees, as prescribed by the security for expenses statute of either Pennsylvania,2 the state in which the court was
of each case. Since the majority of the Court in the Anastaplo case refused to pass
upon the wisdom of the state's action therein and there was no evidence adverse to
the petitioner, he believed that the test has been improperly applied. 366 U.S. at 111-12.
26. 366 U.S. at 74-75.
27. Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 (1863). It is also constitutionally permissible for
bar applicants to be required to take an oath to support the federal constitution under
state law. See State Bar v. Langert, 43 Cal. 2d 636, 276 P.2d 596 (1954).
28. In these two cases the deciding vote was cast by Mr. Justice Stewart. As the
personnel of the Court changes and new exigencies appear the balance may swing in
either direction. See DouGLAs, A LirnnG BmL OF RIGHTS 23-58 (1961).
1. 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958). This section is implemented by § 29(b),
48 Stat. 903, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ce (1958) and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.106-5 (1949).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Supp. 1960). This statute requires that in any
derivative action by holders of less than 5%of the outstanding stock, the plaintiffs must
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sitting, or New Jersey,3 the state of incorporation and Borne's principal
place of business. 4 The district court denied the motion. In the court of
appeals, held, affirmed. In a stockholders' derivative action -brought in a
federal court for a violation of the Securities Exchange Act, the plaintiff is
not required to post security for expenses even though both the state in,
which the court sits and the state of incorporation require security for
expenses. McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), certdenied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
Although Erie R.R. v. Tompkins5 held that a federal court exercising,
diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law, it is clear that Eriehas no direct application to cases arising under federal laws; both the policy
6
and the constitutional bases -of Erie are confined to diversity jurisdiction. '
Thus, even though the Supreme Court in, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.7 ruled that Erie requires a federal district court to apply state,
security for expenses statutes in diversity cases, it does not necessarily follow that the same result would be reached in federal question cases. In,
such cases, if state law is to apply, it is because federal law is "interstitial"
in its nature-that is, the federal law leaves gaps unregulated by congressional legislation or intent, and these gaps or interstices may be governed.
by state law.8 When, for example, no provision has been made for certain
matters such as statutes of limitations, 9 when a term of the act requires:
further definition, 10 and when matters more peculiarly of state interest
give security for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which may beincurred by the corporation or the other defendants.
3. N.J. STAT. AN. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1960). The New Jersey security for expenses.
statute is similar to the Pennsylvania statute except that New Jersey does not require
the security if the value of the plaintiffs' shares is in excess of $50,000.

4. The defendants also argued that security for expenses is either required by general
federal equity law, or should be implied from section 10(b) by analogy to other provi-

sions of the Securities Acts. See note 25 infra.
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. Id., passim; see, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Rothenberg
v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 183 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1950); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465 (1942)

(Jackson, J., concurring).

"Where, on the other

hand, a federal matter is involved state law has no bearing except to the extent that
federal law makes reference to and utilizes it." 2 MoonE, FEDERAL PRAC-ICE 456 (2d

ed. 1948). But cf. Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HAxv. L. REv. 1013.
(1953).
7. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
8. HART & WEclsLER, THE FEDERAL CounTs AND =rE FEDERAL SYsT~m 435-36
(1953). See generally Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation,
69 HAIv. L. REv. 66 (1955); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 797 (1957); Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Cases, 69 YALE L.J. 142&

(1960).
9. Cambell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895)

(suits at law).

Compare Holmberg

v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
10. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) ("children"); R.FC. v. Beaver
County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) ("real property"); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321
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have not been pre-empted,"1 state law may round out a federal statute or

a federally created right.12 But where a federal statute is involved, before
the state law may be applied the proper method of analysis (at least in
actions at law) is to look first to the federal statute for an express or implied
rule of law. If this is not found, the particular state law may be used only
13
when it does not conflict with the policy of the federal statute and is not
14 This analysis was skirted in Fielding v. Allen,15
surprising or capricious.
in which the Second Circuit passed on the question of whether a forum
state's security for expenses statute would apply in a derivative suit arising
under the Interstate Commerce Act.16 Adjudging the corporation's right
of action to be federally created, the court went on to find that the stockholders' right to maintain the derivative action for the corporation was also
federally conferred and thus not subject to special requirements for cognate
actions under state law.' 7 The court based its decision on the federal
court's historic equity jurisdiction which is said to be uniform and not subU.S. 144 (1944) ("public utilities"). See also HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note
8, at 456-57, for the more complex problem presented by tax statutes.
11. See, e.g., Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945); Board of County Comm'rs v.
United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
12. Note, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1446 (1960).
13. Circuit Judge Tuttle has stated the proper method of approach to be as follows: "To begin with first principles, this question is one arising under the statutes of
the United States; those statutes being next to the Constitution the supreme law, it is
in them that we should first look for the solution. We are free to construe those statutes
by the principles generally accepted in the federal courts, without recourse to the law
of any state; and in areas where Congress has legislated extensively so as to establish
a general policy, that policy may furnish the answer to a particular question, even
though the federal statutes do not expressly answer it, and though a state statute expressly enacts a contrary rule .... But, failing a complete solution in the federal statutes
(and the penumbral area where Congress has so 'filled the field' that state law can have
no application) we may then properly look to the foundation of legal interests and
relationships created only by state law, to which the federal statutes must be related
either because by their terms they postulate such interests and relationships, or because constitutional limitations of federal power require this." Fahs v. Martin, 224
F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1955). (Emphasis by court.) See, e.g., Board of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939); Fischer v. Karl, 6 F.R.D.
268, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1946) (state requirement of security for attorney's fees inapplicable to patent infringement suit); Hill, supra note 8, at 94; Mishkin, supra note 8, at
805; Note, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 465 (1941); Note, 59 HA.vv. L. REv. 966 (1946);
Note, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960).
14. "This does not mean that a State would be entitled to use the word 'children'
in a way entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage, but at least to the
extent that there are permissable variations in the ordinary concept of 'children' we
deem state law controlling." De Sylva v. Ballentine, supra note 10, at 581. Cf. Davies
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 152 (1944).
15. 181 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950).
16. Interstate Commerce Act § 5(4), as amended, 54 Stat. 907 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(4) (1958).
17. 181 F.2d at 168. Even prior to Fielding a district court had summarily held that
the New York security for expenses statute did not apply to a derivative suit brought
under the Securities Exchange Act. Stella v. Kaiser, 81 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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ject to the peculiar requirements of local law.18 It was conceded, however,
that "the question is not free from doubt" in light of the strong language
used in the Cohen case;19 but the court felt that Cohen should be limited
to diversity cases. Most of the courts and authors which have considered
the result reached in Fielding v. Allen have accepted it without question.2 0

Chief Judge Biggs in the instant case, after a preliminary examination of
security for expenses statutes,21 concluded that such a statute unquestionably poses a serious obstacle to those shareholders who desire to maintain
derivative suits.2 The statute of Pennsylvania was summarily disposed of

on the basis that the Erie doctrine and the Cohen case were not in point as
18. "The equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is' the same that the
High Court of Chancery in England possesses; is subject to neither limitation or
restraint by State legislation, and is uniform throughout the different States of the
Union." Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868). Accord, e.g., Neves v.
Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 267, 272 (1851); Guffey v.'Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915);
Sprague v. Ticonic Natl Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1039); 2 MOORE, FEERAL PRACTICE 456
(2d ed. 1948); Morse, The Substantive Equity Historically Applied by the U.S. Courts,
54 Dicic. L. REv. 10 (1949); Note, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 966, 972 (1946).
19. 181 F.2d at 168. The Cohen case said: "The very nature of the stockholder's
derivative action makes it one in the regulation of which the legislature of a state has
wide powers. Whatever theory one may hold as to the nature of the corporate entity,
it remains a wholly artificial creation whose internal relations between management and
stockholders are dependent upon state law and may be subject to most complete and
penetrating regulation, either by public authority or by some form of stockholder
action ....
We conclude that the state has plenary power over this type of litigation."
337 U.S. at 549-50.
20. See Hoover v. Allen, 180 F. Supp. 263, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (cause of action
based on Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 136 F. Supp.
301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Investment Co. Act of 1940; defendant attacked soundness
of Fielding); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 789 (2d Cir. 1951) (by
implication) (Rule 10b-5); Dabney v. Alleghany Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (by implication) (§ 10b of Act of 1934); HENN, CoRsonA'roNs 592 (1961);
3 Loss, SEcuarriEs BEGULATION 1839 n.512 (2d ed. 1961); 3 MoorE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 3506 n.47 (Supp. 1960); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 275 (1952); cf.

Le Boeuf v. Austrian, 240 F.2d 546, 551 (4th Cir. 1957). But see Hill, supra note 8,
at 94-95 suggesting other theories on which Fielding should have been decided.
21. 292 F.2d at 827-29. A minority of states have passed various forms of security
for expenses statutes to prevent the abuse of stockholders' derivative suits. See, e.g.,
CAL. CoRn'. CODE ANN. § 834; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-30-21

(Supp. 1960);

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. GEN. Cor'. LAw § 61-b; N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 10-19-48 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Supp. 1960); Wis.

STAT. ANN. § 180.405(4) (1957); MD. R.P. 328 § b. As tofederal law, FED. R. Cv.
P. 23(c) was designed to prevent such abuse by requiring court approval before a class
action may be dismissed or compromised. Security for expenses, as a method of
dealing with the abuse of derivative suits, has been greatly criticized. See, e.g.,
BALT.ANTIn;
ConroRATIoNs § 157(a) (rev. ed. 1946); LAIrn, CORPORATIONS ch. 8,
§ 14 (1959); Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholder's Derivative Suits in New
York, 32 CArLF. L. REv. 123 (1944); House, Stockholder's Suits and the CoudertMitchell Laws, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 377 (1945). Also articles cited in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550 n.5 (1949). Contra, Note, 52
COLUm. L. REv. 267 (1952). The general opinion seems to be that, "The cleansing
effect of the threat of such [derivativel suits would seem to an impartial observer to
far outweigh the possible abuse through strike suits." LATTIN, op. cit. supra at 388.
22. 292 F.2d at 829.
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to nondiversity cases and that Pennsylvania's only significant contact with
this litigation was as the forum state. Although the court noted that New
Jersey, the state of incorporation and principal office of Borne, had a clear
interest in the relationships of these stockholders and their corporation, it
held the New Jersey statute also inapplicable relying on the reasoning of
Fielding v. Allen2 3 as to a uniform federal equity jurisprudence. In addition, the court insisted that state law is applicable only where that law
will not cut across the federal interests receiving expression in the federal
right sought to be enforced.24 Thus the court concluded that where a
unique and controversial state doctrine such as a security for expenses
statute alters relationships that are the principal concern of a federal statute
(the Securities Exchange Act), that docrine will not be applied to limit
rights arising under the federal statute2 5
There can be no question but that the result reached in the Fielding and
Borne cases is the correct one. Discerning the proper basis for holding the
state statute inapplicable when the suit has been brought on the traditional
equity side of the federal court is a more difficult problem. The analysis
of the Fielding case was that when the form of relief exists within the

federal court's historic equity jurisdiction (that which the High Court of
Chancery in England possessed), the peculiar requirements of local law
27
are not applicable.26 There is certainly wide authority for this proposition.
But a strict adherence to this rule would seem to eliminate any possibility
for state law filling the interstices of federal legislation, for once this rule
is invoked, there is no need to analyze the relationship between the state
statute and federal law. Although Borne adopted Fielding v. Allen and the
23. Note 15 supra. But note that in Fieldingthe state of incorporation did
not require
security. To the effect that the forum state has an equally valid interest in derivative
suits see Note, 52 COLum. L. REv. 267,274-75, n.40 (1952).
24. 292 F.2d at 834.' The court observed that there could have been no intent by
Congress to absorb the state statutes into the act since the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was passed more than a decade before the first state security for expenses statute.
It was also noted that there is a comprehensive body of federal law with respect to
the bringing of derivative suits.
25. Id. at 835. As to the defendants' contentions that "general federal equity law"
requires the posting of security for expenses, the court indicated that it had found no
case in which a federal court had required security for expenses, as opposed to costs,
without express statutory authority. Ibid. The defendant also argued that since a
private remedy has been implied into section 10(b), a security for expenses limitation
should be implied along with the private remedy in view of the fact that some sections
of the Securities Acts which explicitly grant private rights of action have security for
expenses provisions. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), as amended, 48 Stat. 907
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1958); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 48 Stat.
890, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1958); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 897, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1958). But the court felt that the acts do not manifest
a sufficiently clear or uniform policy in favor of security for expenses to allow the
court to imply such a limitation from section 10(b). 292 F.2d at 836-37.
26. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
27. See authorities cited note 18 supra.
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"historic federal equity" theory, it did not stop there.2 The court in Borne
proceeded with an analysis of the intentions of Congress and the question
of whether the security for expenses statutes cut across the federal interests
involved. 29 The result, of course, was the same. However, by the latter
analysis, it would be possible for state law to apply in some instances.
Where a federal statute is being interpreted, the approach seemingly should
be the same in equity as it is at law-that is, state law may be applied only
if the solution is not afforded by the federal -tatute and if the state law
is not contrary to the general policy established by Congress and is not
surprising or capricious. 30 It would also seem that the reasons usually
given for applying uniform federal equity jurisdiction exclusive of state
law are no longer persuasive when the interpretation of a federal statute is
involved. For instance, it was argued that equity principles should be
uniform throughout the federal system. 31 But it is now settled that it is not
necessary for common law to be uniformly applied in the federal courts in
actions at law; the law of the particular state may be used when it satisfies
the necessary requirements and the federal statute does not require uniformity.3 2 There would seem to be little basis for distinguishing between
the two, especially when remedial rights are not involved. One reason
for the outgrowth of the exclusiveness of federal equity can be found in
the early history of federal courts. At that time many states had no separate
courts of equity and often only rudimentary equitable doctrines. 3 This
situation, of course, no longer exists. Perhaps the most convincing explanation of the birth of the doctrine lies in the Rules of Decision Act which up
until 1948 stated:
The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.34

In 1948, however, the act was amended, and "civil actions" was substituted
28. 292 F.2d at 833. "There is much to be said for the argument that a federal right,
uniform in its nature throughout the nation, should be uniformly enforceable pursuant
to federal standards." Ibid. However this finding of the need for uniformity was
based on Congress' intention that the Securities Exchange Act be uniformly enforced.
Query whether the court would have still insisted on uniformity if the federal statute
involved had exhibited an absence of such a desire for uniformity on the part of
Congress. Compare RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
29. 292 F.2d at 833-35.
30. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
31. Cf. Note, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 267, 275 (1952).
32. See Note, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1447-48 (1960), which states: "[T]he actual
administrative burden caused by the application of diverse state laws should be
assessed in each case." Id. at 1448. See Hill, supra note 8, at 117; Note, 9 GEao.
WAsH L. BEv. 465, 473 (1941). See also note 28 supra.
33. See HART &WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 650-51. ,
34. Rev. Stat. § 721 (1875).
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for "trials at common law."35 Thus there is no longer an expression of
congressional intent to differentiate between actions at law and in equity.36
It should be noted, however, that there were exceptions to the exclusiveness
of historic federal equity jurisdiction, 37 this being especially true in questions involving the application of state "substantive" law.38 These exceptions existed despite the strong language to the contrary in those cases
which Fielding followed. 39 But even if these exceptions covered all cases
in which the statutory construction test would apply state law, the latter
test remains preferable, for it is important that the state law be found
unsuitable for specific reasons in order to avoid misapplication of that precedent in later cases. 40 Although the statutory construction process was seemingly used in the Borne case as an alternative decision, 41 it could well mean
a tendency to break away from the concept of exclusive federal equity

jurisdiction.
35. Act of June 25, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
36. See Fulton v. Loew's Inc., 114 F. Supp. 676, 683 (D. Kan. 1953) (dictum); 2
CROSSKEY, PoLrcs AN THE CONSTrrOt[oN 897-902 (1953); Hill, supra note 8, at
94-95, 111-14. "Yet it would appear that the general directive in the Rules of Decision
Act, as historically construed, to apply state procedural law in appropriate instances in
actions at law, is now also a directive to do so in proceedings in equity." Id. at 113.
"Wholesale rejection of state law, when the federal act does not so require, seems
inconsistent with the policy expressed in the Rules of Decision Act." Note, 69 YALE
L.J. 1428, 1447 (1960).
37. See, e.g., Levi v. Murrell, 63 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1933) (state statute of frauds
applied); Hill, supra note 8, at 111-12. Compare Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940),
with Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945).
38. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 1013, 1027-35
(1953). "Yet analysis of the pre-Erie cases shows that almost invariably the uniformity of decision in federal equity was understood to be a uniformity only in matters of
practice and remedy." Id. at 1027-28. Professor Hill would classify the applicability of
security for expenses statutes as a matter of practice. Cf. Hill, supra note 8, at 94.
39. See authorities cited note 18 supra.
40. "The need to articulate all the considerations which influence the choice of
decisional rules becomes manifest when the process of decision is recognized for what
it is: the judiciary is making the law, not finding it." Note, 69 YAIE L.J. 1428, 1452
(1960).
41. It might even be argued that the statutory construction was the primary basis
of the opinion. The court initially stated the issue to be resolved as, "Should this
limitation be, adhered to by a federal court when the corporate right that the plaintiff
seeks to enforce derivatively arises under federal law?" 292 F.2d at 831. In response,
the court stated: "The answer to this question lies in both an examination of the
state security for expenses requirement and the federal right under Rule 10b-5." Ibid.
Such an examination would not be necessary under the uniform federal equity doctrine.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-InterventionA Member of An Association Is Denied
Intervention As of Right in A Government
Antitrust Suit Against the Association
The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (hereinafter called ASCAP) is an unincorporated association made up of several
thousand writers and publishers of musical compositions which grants licenses for the public performance of the compositions, collects and
distributes the resulting revenue among its members. The Government
brought an antitrust action against ASCAP in 1941 in which the Government alleged inter alia that there was a restraint of cbmpetition among
ASCAP's members inter sese in that there was a domination of ASCAP's
activities by its large publisher members. A consent decree was enteied
against ASCAP which decree was modified twice. Appellants, three small
music publishing companies and members of ASCAP, contended that the
latest modification did not go far enough in protecting their interests as
against those of the large publishers. Appellants sought to intervene as
of right under rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied appellants' motion to intervene. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court,2 held, denial of intervention affirmed and appeal dismissed.
In a government antitrust suit against dominant members of an association
to prevent discrimination against the other members, the latter may not
intervene as of right. Sam Fox PublishingCo. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683
(1961).
Rule 24(a) (2) .provides that a party may intervene as of right in an
action upon timely application 3 "when the representation of the applicant's
interests by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is
1. "(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action ... (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound
by a judgment in the action ....
"
2. The appellants appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court from a
district court decision under the provisions of the Expediting Act, 62 Stat. 989 (1948),
15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958), which provides: "In every civil action brought in any district
court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the
Supreme Court."
3. The question of timeliness of the motion must be decided on the particular facts
of each case. See, e.g., Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960) (where principal defendants had not drawn up issues, motion filed one year after complaint was filed
was timely); Simms v. Andrews, 118 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1941) (decision as to
motion's timeliness is in the discretion of the court); United States v. Wilhelm Reich
Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96 (D. Me. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 957 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 842 (1955) (motion made two months after default judgment held untimely).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 15

or may be bound by a judgment in the action.. . ."4 Adequacy of represen-

tation is largely a factual question. 5 The more difficult question in determining whether there should be intervention of right is the interpretation

of the word "bound." Some courts have held that a party will be considered
"bound" if a judgment in the existing action would greatly prejudice his

rights.6 Others have held that for a party to be bound the judgment
must be res judicata as to him.7 This latter construction raises a problem
with regard to intervention under rule 24(a) (2) in a representative action 8
since a person cannot be bound by a judgment unless his interests are
adequately represented.9
The Court in the instant case first disposed of the question of appellants'
right to intervene if their interests are considered aligned with the Government. The question of the adequacy of representation of appellants' interests was not decided by the Court because the appellants would not be
bound by a judgment in the action. Since the Government is not bound
by a judgment in an antitrust action to which it is a stranger, so also a
private party is not bound by a judgment in a Government suit to which
he, the private party, was a stranger. The Court admitted that a decree
4. FED.R.Cirv. P. 24(a)(2).
5. Certain factors suggest to the court that representation of the applicant is or may
be inadequate. For example, fraud or collusion, mishandling of the case, adverse
interests of the representative and the applicant and unfriendly relations between the
representative and the applicant. See, e.g., Kozak v. Wells, supra note 3; Ford Motor
Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957); Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 220 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1955); Cuthill v. Ortman-Miller Mach. Co., 216 F.2d
336 (7th Cir. 1954); Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953); Pyle-National
Co. v. Amos, 179 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1949); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944); Union Nat'l Bank v. Superior Steel Corp., 9
F.R.D. 124 (W.D. Pa. 1949); Christon v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 327 (E.D. Pa. 1947);
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW, 3 F.R.D. 251 (W.D. Va. 1943);
United States v. C. M. Lane Lifeboat Co., 25 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). See
generally Note, Intervention of Private Parties Under Federal Rule 24, 52 CoLIM. L.
REV. 922 (1952).
6. See, e.g., Kozak v. Wells, supra note 3; Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., supra
note 5; Textile Workers v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Clark v.
Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953).
7. Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 (1951); Formulabs, Inc. v.
Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960); Cameron v. President and Fellows,
157 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1946); Kelley v. Pascal Systems, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 775 (E.D.
Ky. 1960); Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1958);
United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, supra note 3; United States v. General
Elec. Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1950); Innis, Speiden & Co. v. Food Mach. Corp.,
2 F.R.D. 261 (D. Del. 1942); Owen v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.
Cal. 1941); United States v. C. M. Lane Lifeboat Co., supra note 5. For a general
discussion of the interpretations given the word "bound" as used in this rule, see Note,
Intervention and the Meaning of "Bound" Under Federal Rule 24(a) (2), 63 YA=.
L.J. 408 (1954).
8. For a discussion of this problem, see Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv.L. REV. 874, 897 (1958).
9. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See generally Developments in the LawRes Judicata, 65 HARv. L. Rxv. 818, 858 (1952).
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entered in this action would probably preclude or limit further relief for
appellants but held that this is not the same as "bound" under rule
24(a) (2) since there must be a legal preclusion to satisfy this requirement
of the rule.10 The second problem the Court considered was whether the
appellants were entitled to intervene if they were aligned with ASCAP. In
determining this question, the Court equated the meaning of adequacy of
representation under rule 24(a) (2) with adequacy of representation for
the purposes of res judicata. In so doing, the Court stated that appellants
could not be inadequately represented in a class action and at the same
time be bound by a judgment rendered in such action." Thus, the effect of
the decision in the instant case seems to preclude intervention in a class
action by a member of the class under rule 24(a)(2).
It could be argued that since this effect would result from a strict interpretation of "bound," the interpretation should be broadened so that parties
12
that are not legally precluded, could seek intervention under this rule.
However, if intervention under rule 24(a) (2) was allowed in actions such
as the one in the instant case, such intervention would interfere with the
Government's prosecution of antitrust suits. For this reason a party seeking
intervention in this type of action should do so under the provisions of
rule 24(b) (2)13 which makes the grant of intervention discretionary. In
the present case, appellants failed to appeal from a denial of a motion to
intervene under rule 24(b) (2) 14 and therefore the Court was not called
upon to decide whether the decision below was an abuse of discretion. It
seems that the best way to deal with the problem of intervention in an
action such as the one in the instant case is to allow it only under rule
24(b)(2) where the court can exercise its discretion as to the propriety
of such intervention.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. "[A]ppellants . . . face this dilemma: the judgment in a class action will bind
only those members of the class whose interests have been adequately represented by
existing parties to the litigation . . . yet intervention as of right presupposes that

an intervenor's interests are or may not be so represented." 366 U.S. at 691.
12. See note 6 supra.
13. "(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted

to intervene in an action . . . (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common. .

.

.In exercising its discretion

the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
14. It is not settled whether denial of intervention under rule 24(b) can be reversed
for abuse of discretion. Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., supra note 5, with
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519 (1947), and

Schockett v. Bromley, 198 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1952), and International Workers
Order v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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Foreign Corporations-Promotional Activities May
Subject Foreign Corporation to State
Qualification Statute
Eli Lilly & Co., an Indiana corporation, sought to enjoin defendant, a
New Jersey corporation, from selling plaintiff's products below fair trade
prices.' Lilly had not qualified to do business under the New Jersey foreign corporation statute and had limited its activities in the state. The New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the action2 holding that plaintiff's New Jersey operations subjected it to qualification as a prerequisite to
suing in the state courts.3 Plaintiff appealed claiming that this requirement violated the commerce clause of the Constitution. In the Supreme
Court of the United States, held, affirmed. 4 The promotional activities of a
foreign corporation, even though unaccompanied by solicitation of orders,
may subject it to state qualification statutes if its intrastate activities are
separable from its interstate activities. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs,
Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
A perennial problem is presented to courts in our American federal system by corporations whose activities are carried on outside the states of
their incorporation. Clearly, the need for a national economy demands
that these businesses remain unhampered by restrictive state laws and regulations; this is the basis for the commerce clause of the federal constitution.
Just as clearly, however, a state must be able to control to some extent the
activities of these foreign corporations within its borders. The conflicts between these two basic policies face the courts most frequently when they
must determine the power of a state to tax multi-state business, to subject
it to judicial jurisdiction, or to license it. So interrelated are these areas
that they may be thought of as a spectrum, with progressively greater
activity necessary to subject the corporation to local suits, to taxation and
to qualification. The test most commonly applied by the courts in making
this determination is the "doing business" test. Since the commerce clause
prohibits unduly restrictive state regulation of interstate commerce, the
usual qualification case has been resolved by labeling a corporation's activities either "interstate" and therefore immune from qualification require1. N.J. REv. STAT. § 56:4-2. (1940).
2. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 31 N.J. 591, 158 A.2d 528 (1960).
3. "Every foreign corporation, except banldng, insurance, ferry and railroad corporations, before transacting any business in this state, shall file in the office of the secretary
of state a copy of its charter or certificate of incorporation . . . ." N.J. REV. STAT. §
14:15-3 (1940). "Until such corporation so transacting business in this state shall
have obtained such certificate of the secretary of state, it shall not maintain any action
in this state upon any contract made by it in this state." N.J. RBv. STAT. § 14:15-4
(1940).
4. The Court divided 4-1-4.
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ments, or "intrastate" and therefore subject to qualification requirements.
There appears to be no sure guide for locating the line beyond which the
corporation must not proceed without qualifying. 5 It has been said that an
isolated act by a corporation is not "doing business" unless that act is part
7
of the ordinary business of the corporation. 6 Nor will maintaining an offibe,
8
prosecuting or defending a suit, soliciting orders through traveling salesmen9 or through the mail' 0 alone be enough to require the corporation to
qualify. When, however, these acts, or others, are combined, it becomes
increasingly likely that the courts will determine that the corporation's
local business is sufficient to require it to qualify.
The Court's opinion, by Mr. Justice Black, reviewed briefly the long list
of authorities for the principle that a corporation doing only interstate
business in a foreign state cannot be required to register under qualification
statutes." After restating this principle, 12 the Court turned to the question
of whether Lilly's dealings in New Jersey could be characterized as interstate or intrastate. The proof showed that Lilly: (1) maintained an office
in New Jersey; (2) placed its name on the door and on the lobby directory;
(3) listed the office in both the regular and classified sections of the telephone directory; (4) paid on a salary basis the secretary and eighteen detailmen who used the office; (5) used these detailmen to visit retail pharmacists, physicians and hospitals to promote its products; (6) permitted the
detailmen to receive occasional orders for transmittal to New Jersey wholesalers; and (7) directed them to furnish to retailers advertising and promotional material and to advise the retailers on merchandising its products."
This set of facts, said the Court, argued so strongly that the business done
was intrastate that to hold otherwise would be "to completely ignore reality." 14 Relying upon Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts,5 the Court said that
the distinction between a systematic solicitation of orders in that case and
the promotional work done here "goes only to the nature of the intrastate
business Lilly is carrying on, not to the question of whether it is carrying
on an intrastate business." 16 The Court distinguished International Textbook Co. v. Pigg"' and similar cases upon which Lilly relied by saying that
5. Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 1018 (1925).
6. Worcester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson Airport Authority, 233 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.

1956).
7. Alfred M. Best Co. v. Goldstein, 124 Conn. 597, 1 A.2d 140 (1938).
8. Compagnie du Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163
(S.D. Maine 1927).
9. Robbins v. Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
10. Standard Fashion Co. v. Cummings, 187 Mich. 196, 153 N.W. 814 (1915).
11. 366 U.S. at 277-78.
12. Id. at 278.
13. Id. at 279-80.
14. Ibid.
15. 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
16. 366 U.S. at 282.
17. 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
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Lilly sued upon a contract entirely separable from any particular interstate sale and that "the power of the state is consequently not limited by
cases involving such contracts." 18 In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Harlan stated that Lilly's New Jersey operations are 'local" because they
result in increased purchases from wholesalers in the state, and not from
out-of-state sources. He argued that promoting Lilly's products among
those who can buy only from New Jersey wholesalers does not bear "the
same close relationship to the necessities of keeping the channels of interstate commerce state-unburdened" as does the "drummer" situations; that
a licensing requirement "does not deny Lilly a significant chance to reach
New Jersey customers"; that Lilly's operations "concerned merely the
doing of a local act after interstate commerce had completely terminated,"
and that "the only aspect of the present case that resembles the 'drummer'
cases is the fact that Lilly's promotion of local sales ultimately serves to
increase its interstate sales." 19
Two years before the Court decided the Lilly case, it decided that closely
similar activities were an inseparable part of interstate commerce. 20 As a
result of the Lilly decision, many corporations apparently are faced with
the prospect of re-evaluating their operations in foreign states to determine
whether they must now qualify in those states to escape penalties of being
an unlicensed foreign corporation. This decision, as Mr. Justice Douglas
pointed out in his lucid dissent, "blends ...three distinct lines of decisions
which until today have been considered separate .... I refer to our deci-

sions concerning the power of a State (1) to tax an interstate enterprise,
(2) to subject it to local suits, and (3) to license it."2 1 Although the Court's
decision was perhaps not entirely unforeseen,2 it appears definitely to
blur the lines between the three areas of "doing business." If Mr. Justice
Douglas's interpretation is correct and the three lines of decisions are truly
blended, it would seem that a state which could levy an allowable tax upon
a foreign corporation could also require it to qualify. The logical result of
applying the tests used in one area to cases in the other two apparently
would be that the "minimum contacts" doctrine applicable to questions of
judicial jurisdiction could be applied to questions of qualification.2 This
18. 366 U.S. at 283.
19. 366 U.S. at 288 (concurring opinion).

20. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
21. 366 U.S. at 288, 289.
22. "[M]any decisions do not distinguish the concept 'doing business'... and sometimes indiscriminately cite cases involving, for example, 'doing business' for service of
process purposes, in connection with questions involving 'doing business' for qualification purposes. It would appear that in view of the trend of the recent United States
Supreme Court decisions away from the use of any symbolic concept, such as 'presence'
or 'doing business', these instances will occur less often and more direct analysis will be
required with respect to the particular problem involved." Keane & Collins, Changing
Concepts of What Constitutes "Doing Business" by Foreign Corporations, 42 MARQ.
L. REv. 151, 162 (1958).
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Although the
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of course would require virtually every corporation doing multi-state business to qualify in every state in which it carried on activities similar to
Lilly's promotional work in New Jersey. Interestingly, the Court's decision
to allow a state tax to stand after deciding that the taxpayer's activities
were interstate 4 provoked such a storm of reaction that Congress attempted

by statute;s to negate the effect of the decision, and ordered a thorough
study of the entire area of state taxation of income from interstate commerce.2 Apparently there has been no similar reaction to the Lilly decision,
which could indicate that the corporations most likely to be affected by it

do not consider the problem to be of special significance. It would seem
that the mechanical "doing business" test which the Court continues to
apply in such cases is destined to compound rather than clarify the confusion which now exists. Already the Court has abandoned it in the area of
judicial jurisdiction, adopting instead the "minimum contacts" test.2 7 Such
a test, which recognizes the conflict between the basic policies to be reconciled, offers a sound basis for reconciling them: Are the corporation's activities in the state such in quality or in quantity to demand the application of
the policy in favor of state control rather than the policy of protecting an

unhampered national economy?

Labor Law-Labor Unions-A Minority Union May
Be Disestablished for Attempting To Exercise the

Rights of An Exclusive Bargaining Agent
Petitioner labor union, at a time when there was no existing bargaining
agent or other competing union, initiated an organizational campaign at a
Bernhard-Altmann plant.' As a result of negotiations with the employer,
Court did not have before it any question involving the commerce clause, but was
dealing with due process only, these words of Mr. Justice Black in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), seem to be pertinent to this discussion:
"[A] trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to
the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many
commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated
by the full content." But cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
24. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 20.
25. State Taxation of Income From Interstate Commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. II
1959). For a detailed discussion of the state taxation problem, see Hartman, State
Taxation of Corporate Income, 13 V-N. L. REv. 21, 23-48 (1959).

26. Id. § 382.

27. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 23.
1. During the organizational campaign certain of the company's employees struck
to protest a wage reduction. - The campaign continued and the strike in no way
affected the Board or the Court's decision even though some of the striking employees
signed petitioner union's authorization cards.
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a "memorandum of understanding" was signed designating petitioner the
exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in an agreed upon
unit and providing for wages and working conditions. 2 Both the union
and the employer believed that a majority of the employees supported
the union, but neither made any effort to substantiate this belief. In
fact, consent by a majority of the employees had not been obtained.3
After first approving the trial examiner's finding of no unfair labor practice,
the NLRB, upon exceptions filed by the General Counsel, reversed its
decision and held the employer guilty of violating sections 8(a) (1) and
8(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 4 by executing a contract with
the union at a time it did not enjoy majority status and the union guilty of
violating section 8(b)(1) (A) by restraining and coercing the employees
in exercising their rights guaranteed by section 7 of the act. In addition
the Board ordered the disestablishment of the union for all purposes until
an election could be held and refused to allow it to continue as the
representative of the minority members whom it did represent. The court
of appeals affirmed. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, held, affirmed. Disestablishment for all purposes is a proper remedy
when a minority union has attempted to achieve the status of exclusive
bargaining agent even where the attempt resulted from good faith error.
International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
The National Labor Relations Act envisages a system of collective
2. The memorandum of understanding in addition to making petitioner the exclusive
bargaining agent of all production and shipping employees, called for an end to the
strike, certain improved wages and conditions of employment, and signing of a formal
contract within two weeks. The most important provision from the petitioner's point
of view was a separability clause providing that should any provision of the agreement
be held invalid, the remainder of the agreement was not to be affected.
3. It was not disputed as of the signing of the formal agreement that petitioner in
fact represented a majority of employees in the designated unit. The Court, however,
considered this irrelevant as the unfair labor practice was a "fait accompli" as of the
signing of the memorandum of understanding.
4. Sections 8(a)(1) and (2) in their pertinent parts provide: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7; (2) to dominate or interfere
with the formation of administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it...." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(1), (2) (1958).
Section 8(b)(1)(A) in itspertinent parts provides: "Itshall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor union or itsagents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 . . .. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1)(A) (1958).
Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be, affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(A) (3)." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
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bargaining based upon unions which have the support of a majority of the
employees and which, therefore, may justly be given the status of exclusive
agent. The position of a minority union is not expressly covered by tle

act in any detail, and uncertainty exists as to what these minority unions
may and may not do. Generally, it is an unfair labor practice for a minority
union to seek to be the exclusive bargaining agent; 5 to seek a union
security agreement; 6 or to place an employer on a "We do not patronize"

list.7 It has been held, however, that absent an exclusive bargaining agent

a minority union has the right to bargain and present grievances for its
members only.8 Such a situation exists where there is only a single minority
union or where several unions are competing for recognition as the exclusive
agent.9 Even though a rival union has a majority card showing, a minority
union may seek Board determination of conflicting representation claims. 10
Following an election in which no union has been certified" or in which

an existing bargaining agent has been decertified,12 a minority union may
picket peacefully for organizational purposes.' 3 After losing an election,
however, a minority union may not exert the economic pressure of informational picketing to force an employer to bargain with it.14 If an uncertified

majority union has become a minority union because of the replacement of
employees in the unit during a period of economic stress, it can not force
5. United Transp. Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 668 (1959).
6. Max Factor & Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 808 (1957); Byran Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B.
502 (1957); Morse Bros., 118 N.L.R.B. 1312 (1957); Lively Photos Inc., 123
N.L.R.B. 1054 (1959); Sierra Furniture Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1198 (1959).
7. Layne Bryant, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 688 (1958); Jackson Tile Mfg. Co., 122
N.L.R.B. 764 (1958).
8. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). It is questionable if
a right exists. Although the court used the expression "right," most probably it meant
"privilege" as there is no statutory right.
9. Case No. K-493, Administrative Decisions of the NLBB General Counsel (1956),
C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep. 1f3147.425.
10. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1951); The Wheland Co.,
120 N.L.R.B. 814 (1958).
11. Case No. 1069, Administrative Decisions of the NLRB General Counsel (1954),
C.C.H. Lab. L. Rep. f[5150.85.
12. Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 269 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1959), rev'd per
curiam, 362 U.S. 329 (1960). For a good discussion of a closely related subject, the
one year certification rule and interplay of the "contract bar" rule, see Neary, The
Unior's Loss of Majority Status and the Employer's Obligation To Bargain, 36 TEXAS
L. REv. 878 (1958).
13. NLRB v. Local 639, Drivers Union, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957), alftd, 362
U.S. 274 (1960). To understand the Board's position on peaceful picketing see the
annual reports of the NLRB for the years 1958 through 1960; Comment, 34 WASH. L.
REv. 421 (1959). For an excellent discussion of section 8(b) (7) problems with an
emphasis on status and recognitional picketing, see Merrifield, Picketing Practicee
Under Section 8(b) (7), L.M.R.A., in LABOR MANAGmnwT RELATioNs AND LABoR
LAW, INSTITUTE OF MANAOEMENT OF = ScHooL OF BusINEss OF Nomyorx Co.GE
OF WH.I.IAm Am MARY 234 (1961).

Both the problem solved and those raised by the

recent decision are explored by this noted authority in the field.
14. Percello v. Retail Store Employees, 188 F. Supp. 192 (D. Md. 1960).
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an employer to bargain with it as the exclusive agent, 15 but if the loss of
majority status was the result of an employer unfair labor practice, the
Board may nevertheless require the employer to treat the minority union
as the exclusive bargaining agent.16 Even where the majority of employees
has chosen an exclusive bargaining agent, a minority union may peacefully
picket for recognition as a minority representative.17 Furthermore, under
section 9(a) individual members and minority unions have the right to
present grievances and have them adjusted, a right which has been interpreted to include all disputes which could be covered by a collective
bargaining agreement so long as the exclusive bargaining agent is allowed
to be present at the meeting and the result reached is not inconsistent with
the terms of the collective bargaining contract. 18 Nor are minority unions
precluded from entering into contracts of employment embodying matters
not within the statutory scope of collective bargaining, provided the contract is not inconsistent with an existing bargaining agreement, does not
itself constitute an unfair labor practice, or does not require less of an
employer, nor more of the workers than does the agreement made by the
majority union.19
The instant case presented no question of competing unions or of
striking or picketing by a minority union. The vice of the agreement here
was the mistaken requesting and granting of recognition as the exclusive
bargaining agent when the union did not in fact have a majority support.
The Supreme Court, as well as the majority of the Board and the court
of appeals, could conceive of "no clearer abridgment of § 7 of the Act
." by both the employer and the union. In the Court's opinion, the
good faith belief of both parties of the union's majority status was no
defense to the unfair labor practice charges since nothing in the act
required scienter as an element of the offense. To allow the defense
would permit the negligence of unions and employers to frustrate free
employee choice of a bargaining agent. Without discussion, the majority
approved the Board's order denying the validity of the contract even as
to the minority of the employees whom the union actually did represent.
It was to this later, remedial point that Justices Black and Douglas directed
their dissent. While tacitly acknowledging that the mistaken granting of
recognition as exclusive agent might be an unfair labor practice for both
employer and union which would justify disestablishment of the union as
the representative of all employees, they could find no compelling reason
for denying to the minority of the employees the advantages they had won
in the contract or that they would receive by continued union representa15. GENERAL Coussr.E DECISION II 10499 (1916).
16. NLRB v. Burke Mach. Tool Co., 133 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1943).

17. See note 14 supra.
18. Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Union, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 134 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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tion of their minority interests. To them, the right of minority representation and bargaining had been recognized at the common law and they
"found nothing in the history of the successive measures, starting with the
Wagner Act, that... [would] deny a minority union the right to bargain
for its members when a majority have not in fact chosen a bargaining
representative." To do so here, thought the dissenting Justices, "smacks
more of a penalty than of a remedial measure."2 0
The result in this case seems justified on the basis of leaving to the
National Labor Relations Board the working out of a policy for minority
unions and on the practical ground that in this fact situation, complete
disestablishment of the uni6n until an election could be held seems unlikely
to work a particular hardship. As a precedent illuminating the shadowy
area of minority union status, however, the case leaves much to be desired.
Court development of a- consistent comprehensive policy for the minority
union seems both improper and impossible; responsibility lies with the
Board. This case adds one more detail to the conduct denied to minority
unions; a full rounded statement of what they may do is yet to be made.

Limitation of Actions-In A Malpractice Action the
Statute of Limitations Does Not Begin To Run
Until the Patient Knows or Has Reason

To Know of His Injury
On April 26, 1955, the plaintiff was operated on by the defendant doctor
and remained under his care until November 1955. After the operation

plaintiff suffered back pains and in August 1958, an X-ray was taken. It
disclosed that a wing nut from a retractor used in the operation had been
left in her abdomen. On August 13, 1959, plaintiff filed a complaint in the
superior court alleging malpractice. Defendant's motion for summary
judgment was granted on the grounds that the two year statute of limitations for tort actions had run and barred the action.' On appeal to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, held, reversed. In a malpractice action
where the alleged negligence is the failure to remove a foreign object, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the patient knows or
has reason to know of the foreign object. Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d
277 (N.J. 1961).
20. International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 744 (1961).
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A, § 14-2 (1952). "Every action at law for an injury to the
person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this state
shall be commenced within 2 years after the cause of any action shall have accrued."

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15

Statutes of limitations are designed to "promote justice by preventing

surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."2 Only seventeen states have statutes of limitations specifically dealing with malpractice: 3 In most of the states, malpractice actions
based on negligence are governed :by general tort statutes of limitations4
most of which require that the injured party bring his action within two
years from the time it accrues. The question of when thecause of action
"accrues" has appeared frequbntlys-since the passage of the Limitations
Act of 1623.6 In malpractice actions where the doctor has left a foreign
object in the patient, the majority of jurisdictions hold that the patient's
cause of action arises when the incision is closed. 7 The ratio decidendi of
these cases is that the negligent act and not the actual damage gives rise
to the cause of action. The negligent act is said to cause a legal injury
and all subsequent injuries are taken into consideration in the determination
of damages. 8 To decide otherwise "would permit a patient, affected with
some malady, to trace that malady to an original cause alleged to have
occurred years and years ago." 9 A minority of jurisdictions have rejected
this rule and have held that the cause of action does not necessarily accrue
when the negligent act is committed. Some courts hold, as did the instant
case, that the cause of action arises when the injured patient knows or
2. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
3. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, and South Dakota.
4. It should be noted that statutes of limitations other than those for malpractice
and tort actions may be applicable to an injury arising out of the patient-doctor relationship. If the operation is performed without the patient's consent, the statute of
limitations for assault and battery may be applicable. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261,
104 N.W. 12 (1950). A few states (but not New Jersey) regard the injury as a breach
of contract which gives rise to either a contract action or a tort action. Manning v.
Serrano, 97 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1957). See also RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 899, comment b
(1939). If the patient has died as a result of the doctor's negligence, the statute of
limitations for wrongful death will control. Natcchioni v. Felter, 54 Ohio App. 180, 6
N.E.2d 764 (1936). For additional comment on these statutes and on statutes of
limitations generally, see Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAIIv.
L. REV. 1177 (1950); LOUISELL & WmULAms, TnmAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
377 (1960). This comment will be concerned only with tort and malpractice statutes
of limitations since these are pleaded as a defense more frequently than the others,
5. Saunders v. Edwards, 1 Sid. 95, 82 Eng. Rep. 991 (K.B. 1662) (action for libel;
issue: when did the cause of action arise).
6. Limitations Act, 1632, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16. This statute is generally considered to be
the foundation of modem statutes of limitations.
7. Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940); Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Ass'n,
265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936); Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653
(1919); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1930).
8. Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga. App. 133, 174 S.E. 365 (1934).
9. Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140, 142 (1934).
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should know of the foreign object.10 Alabama and Connecticut have passed
statutes" adopting this view. Other courts have not granted the patient this
much protection and have said that the cause of action arises when the
treatment is complete. 12 Some of these courts say that failing to remove
the foreign object during subsequent treatment constitutes continuing
negligence.' 3 Another theory that has been employed is that the cause
of action arises when the patient-doctor relationship is dissolved. 14 Both
the majority and minority hold that if the patient is under a disability,'5 or

the foreign object has been fraudulently concealed,

6

the statute of limita-

tions will be tolled.

The decision by the supreme court in the instant case overruled several
prior New Jersey decisions which had followed the majority rule.17 Since
the New Jersey Legislature had never specified when a cause of action
arose within the meaning of the New Jersey statute of limitations, 18 the
court recognized that its function was to delineate the statute "with due

regard to the underlying statutory policy of repose, without, however,

permitting unnecessary individual injustices." 19 The court decided that in
foreign object malpractice actions the need for repose was outweighed by

the need of allowing individual justice.
The court in the instant case has squarely faced and intelligently sought
to decide the real issue presented by foreign object malpractice cases, that

is, which of the two competing interests, the patient's right to justice or
the doctor's right to protection against stale claims should be preferred.
Since the issue is one of policy considerations, it can reasonably be pre10. California is the leading exponent of this discovery doctrine. Costa v. Regents
of Univ., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). See also
City of Miami v. Grooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954); Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555
(La. App. 1934); Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 Atl. 83 (Md. App. 1917);
Note, Malpractice and the Statute of Limitations, 32 IND. L.J. 528, 533 (1957) (discovery doctrine).
11. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 25(1) (Supp. 1955). "All actions against physicians
...for malpractice . . . must be commenced within two years next after the act or
omission or failure giving rise to the cause of action, and not afterwards. Provided that
if the cause of action is not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered
within such period, then the action may be commenced within six months from the
date of such discovery or the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead
to such discovery ... provided further that in no event may the action be commenced
more than 6 years after such act." CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (1958) is substantially similar to Alabama's.
12. Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
13. Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942).
14. Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931).
15. As, for example, mental incompetency, infancy, or absence from the jurisdiction.
LouismrL & WLLA_,m, TwAL. oF MEDicA

MALPnACTICE CAsEs 377 (1960).

16. Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70, 45 S.W.2d 1072 (1932).
17. Weinstein v. Blanchard, 109 N.J.L. 332, 162 AUt. 601 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932);
Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950).
18. See note 1 supra.
19. 173 A.2d at 285.
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dicted that the courts will reach opposite decisions in the future as they
have in the past. Some middle ground between the two policies should be
adopted so as to give the patient the maximum rights possible while still
allowing the doctor the maximum protection against stale claims. Rather
than place this "tail chasing burden of interpretation" on the courts, it is
submitted that the legislature should resolve the controversy by adopting
statutes of limitations similar to Alabama's or Connecticut's. 20 Such a statute
would extend the patient's cause of action, if the injury was unknown to
him while protecting the doctor by ending liability completely six years
after the operation. 2 '

Taxation-Income Tax-Embezzled Funds Held
Includable in Gross Income
Taxpayer was convicted for willfully attempting to evade income taxes
by failing to report embezzled funds.1 The court of appeals affirmed the
conviction.2 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held,
affirmed. Commissioner v. Wilcox3 is overruled; a taxpayer must include
embezzled funds in his gross income in the year in which they are misappropriated.4 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1913 provided that "net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits and income ...from ... the transaction of any lawful business.. . ."5 Congress, in 1916, amended the gross
income section of the Code to omit the word "lawful."6 The courts have
inferred from this omission that Congress meant to reach the gains of the
unlawful business as well as those of the lawful and have consistently so
20. It should be noted that the supreme court limited the discovery doctrine to foreign object malpractice cases.
21. See note 11 supra.
1. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 145(b), 53 Stat. 63 (now INT. Rzv. CODE OF
1954, § 7201). Taxpayer, a union official, embezzled in excess of $738,000 during
the years 1951 through 1954 from his employer and from an insurance company. He
pleaded guilty to the offense of conspiracy to embezzle in a New Jersey state court
and was then charged with willfully attempting to evade federal income taxation because of his omission of these funds from his returns for these years.
2. United States v. James, 273 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1959).
3. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
4. Since, however, the statute required the element of willfulness before a conviction
could be maintained and "willfulness could not be proven in a criminal prosecution ...
so long as the statute contained the gloss placed upon it by Wilcox at the time the
alleged crime was committed," a majority of the Court dismissed this case. 366 U.S.
at 221-22.
5. INT. REv. COD. OF 1913, ch. 16, § 1(B), 38 Stat. 167.
6. INT. Rzv. COD: OF 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757.
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held.1 Gains from wrongful misappropriations, as opposed to gains from
illegal businesses, however, have not received the same consistent treatment.8 The Supreme Court in the Wilcox case held that embezzled funds
were not to be included in the taxpayer's return for the year in which
misappropriated because the embezzler lacked a "claim of right" to the
money and was under a "definite, unconditional obligation to repay" 9 his
gains. A later case, Rutkin v. United States,'0 however, included as gross
income in the year received money acquired by extortion. The Court in
Rutkin expressly stated that it was not overruling Wilcox but only limiting
it to its facts. The cases were distinguished on the grounds that the victim
of an embezzlement at no time gives his consent for the embezzler to have
control of the money while the victim of an extortion knowingly consents
to the entire transaction. In addition to consent of the victim, the Rutkin
decision employed a second criterion of taxability: "an unlawful gain, as
well as a lawful one constitutes taxable income when its recipient has such
control over it that as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic value from it."11
The Court in the instant case re-examined the distinction previously
made between Wilcox and Rutkin and found that both the embezzler and
the extortionist acquired money by means of a criminal act and that both
victims were equally entitled to restitution. The distinction between the
embezzler's title to the money being void and the extortionist's title being
voidable was dismissed as being irrelevant; "questions of federal income
taxation are not determined by such 'attenuated subtleties."1 2 In overruling Wilcox, the majority reiterated that the broad congressional policy
was to "tax all gains except those specifically exempted." Stating that the
7. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (bootlegging); United States v.
Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1948) (black market profits); Barker v. Magruder,
95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (usurious loans); Estate of Joseph Karger, 23 P-H TAx
CT. Mzm. 637 (1954) (abortions); George L. Rickard, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929) (transporting illegal movies in interstate commerce).
8. The following cases have held illegal gains to be taxable: Kurrle v. Helvering,
126 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942) (embezzled funds); Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125
F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942) (ransom money); National City Bank v. Helvering, 98
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938) (repudiating a dicta in Rau v. United States, 260 Fed. 131
(2d Cir. 1919) to the effect that money from embezzlement, burglary and robbery
were not taxable). McKnight v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1942) held
embezzled funds were not part of gross income.
9. 327 U.S. at 408. The Court classified the embezzler as a debtor of his victim
and, like the debtor, under a definite obligation to repay.
10. 343 U.S. 130 (1952), 6 VANm. L. REv. 131 (1952).
11. 343 U.S. at 137. For a good history of the "claim of right doctrine" and its
relationship to the Wilcox and Rutkin cases, see Keesling, Illegal Transactions and
the Income Tax, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 26 (1959); Note, Taxation of Misappropriated
Property: The Decline and Incomplete Fall of Wilcox, 62 YALE L.J. 662 (1953); Note,
Taxing Unsettled Income: The "Claim of Right" Test, 58 YALE L.J. 955 (1949).
12. 366 U.S. at 216-17.
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Rutkin decision had "effectively vitiated" 13 the Wilcox rationale, the Court
concluded that the exception in favor of the embezzler should no longer
be maintained. A new rule was announced: 'hen
a taxpayer acquires
earnings, lawfully or unlawfully, without the consensual recognition, expressed or implied, of an obligation to repay and without restriction as to,
their disposition, he has received income which he is required to return,.
even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the
money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its.
equivalent." 14 The Court justified this position by taking notice of the
basic inequity which has heretofore existed between the honest taxpayer
and the criminal embezzler. The honest taxpayer, who has mistakenly
received money in one year, must include this income in his return for
that year even though his right to the money is later ruled invalid. The
Court could not find that Congress intended the embezzler to receive a
more favorable tax treatment than the honest taxpayer.
This case contributes clarity and uniformity in this area of tax law by
setting forth a test which will include in a taxpayer's gross income any
wrongful gains he has received. The Court correctly decided that the sole
issue was whether this gain was realized by the taxpayer sufficiently to be
included in his return for the year of receipt. The fact that the victim of
the embezzlement might be competing with a federal tax lien in attempting
to recoup his loss was properly held not to be a relevant consideration.
Congress rather than the Court should remedy this situation if it is felt to,
be unjust. The chief argument of the dissenting Justices-that federal prosecution for failing to pay taxes on the profits of criminal activity constitutes
an encroachment into the field of state law enforcement' 5-seems an invalid
criticism on at least two grounds. Even under the Wilcox rule embezzled
moneys were not entirely free from taxation; the tax was simply delayed
until the embezzler was no longer under a duty to repay his victim. 16
Federal encroachment would still exist, although like the tax, its effect
would also be delayed. Secondly, and obviously, there are in these situations two separate crimes involved, one against state law and one under
the federal tax statute. A failure of the state to prosecute the crime aganist
13. Ibid. See also Macias v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1955); Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d
632 (8th Cir. 1954); 66 HA.v. L. REv. 173 (1952).
14. 366 U.S. at 219. Chief Justice Warren cited North American Oil Consol. v.
Burnett, 286 U.S. 417 (1932) for the last part of this test. This case introduced the
claim of right doctrine as a method of annual tax accounting. Subsequent cases have
applied the test to determine when a sum would be included in gross income. See,,
e.g., Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S.
590 (1951). Wilcox, however, used the doctrine to determine whether a sum would
be included in gross income. It would seem that the claim of right doctrine has been
restored to its original meaning by the majority opinion in the instant case.
15. 366 U.S. at 230 (Black, J., dissenting).
16. 327 U.S. at 409-10.
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its law is no valid reason for the federal government allowing tax evasion
-to go unpunished. Although there is a possibility that tax evasion prosecutions might be used as a vehicle for unreasonable federal encroachment
into local law enforcement, it seems more likely in most cases that the
-states would welcome federal cooperation in putting criminals behind bars.
Ignoring, however, these considerations of the federal-state relationship,
the decision in the instant case has long been anticipated. The distinction
between Rutkin and Wilcox was too thin to stand up, and with this decision, the Court has returned to a logical symmetry in the taxing of criminal
,gains.

Workmen's Compensation-Compensation Granted
For Heart Attack Induced By Mental and
Emotional Stress
An employee of defendant airline company had been in a "severe and
-protracted state of emotional upset"' for four months prior to his death from
a heart attack. In an action to recover workmen's compensation benefits
for his death, the employee's wife alleged that the emotional condition
arose because his employer's president held him responsible for damage
to one of its planes and for the timely repair of the aircrafL.2 The plaintiff
e3
contended that the emotional stress constituted a compensable "accident"
and that the heart attack was a result of this emotional stress.4 The workmen's compensation board awarded death benefits but was reversed by the
appellate division s on the ground that in the absence of a showing of
physical strain by the decedent there was no compensable injury. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, held, reversed (4-to-3).
Workmen's compensation benefits may be awarded for physical injuries
resulting from a protracted state of mental or emotional stress. Klimas v.
1. The court quoted the finding of the appellate division concerning decedent's

emotional condition and further emphasized the appellate division's finding that this
condition "reached a climax" during the three days preceding decedents death. Klimas
v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 715, 219 N.Y.S.2d
14,15 (1961).
2. The plane had been grounded by the Civil Aeronautics Authority because of

corrosion on its wings, and the company's president had made numerous statements
indicating that Klimas would lose his position if the aircraft was not in operating condition by the end of February.
3. Brief for Appellant, p. 9, Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d
209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961).
4. Id. at 2.
5. 12 App. Div. 2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1960).
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Trans CaribbeanAirways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d
14 (1961).
The great majority of workmen's compensation statutes use the word
"accident" in defining a compensable injury.6 New York follows the general formula by defining injury as "only accidental injuries arising out of
and in the course of employment . . . ."7 Interpretation of the "accident"
requirement has not been uniform. 8 One particularly difficult set of decisions, known as the generalized condition cases, involve injuries which areorganic changes in the body not consisting of a definite "breakage" or collapse.9 The courts have been reluctant to grant compensation for this type
of injury because it is often difficult to establish employment causation.10
They have, therefore, evolved some rather technical definitions for theterm "accident." A minority of states have required the accidental injury
to be caused by "unusual" exertion or exposure,"l or, as expressed by the,
6. The following states require that the injury be "by accident": Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Arkansas,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, and Oklahoma use the term
"accidental injury." The accident requirement has been read into the laws by thecourts of Michigan, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 1 LARSON, WOR, MEN'S CoMPLNsATION § 37.10 (1952, Supp. 1960). For a collection of all of the United States workmen's compensation statutes see 1-4 ScmEmEa, WoRKmEN's COMPENSATION STATUTES
(perm. ed. 1939, Supps. 1948 and 1949) and 1 ScNaEMEM, WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES UPKEEP SERVICE.
7. N.Y. WonIxwzi's ComP. LAW

§ 2 (7).
8. Professor Larson analyzes the wide variation among the states as being due to
the "two-way" meanings given to both the unexpectedness and the definiteness elements
of the accident concept. The problem has arisen because of the question of whether
these elements are to be applied to the cause or the resulting injury. I LARSON, op. cit.
supra note 6, § 37.20.
9. 1 LARSoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 38.30. "Since all compensation acts required
that personal injury to be compensable must be employment-connected, the courts
concluded that the further statutory qualification denoted some additional limitation
and excluded certain employment-connected causes of disability, especially nontraumatic and occupational diseases." Risenfield, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CAar. L. REv. 531, 543 (1954).
10. "The 'heart cases' where it is usually required to show some special effort as
precipitating cause of the attack, stand in a class by themselves, but they do so
because their generalized nature makes it difficult factually to attribute the attack to
the work." Kayser v. Erie County Highway Dep't, 276 App. Div. 789, 92 N.Y.S.2d
612, 613 (1959). 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 38.80.
11. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ariz. 259, 186 P.2d 959
(1947); Belber Trunk & Bag Co. v. Menesy, 47 Del. 595, 96 A.2d 341 (1953); Eastern
Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Young, 218 Md. 338, 146 A.2d 884 (1958); Kemling v. Armour
& Co., 222 Minn. 397, 24 N.W.2d 842 (1946); State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v.
Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S.W.2d (1941); Feagins v. Carver, 162 Neb. 116, 75 N.W.2d
379 (1956); Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Co-op., 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957);
Cartwright v. General Motors Corp., 153 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio App. 1958); Baur v. Mesta
Mach. Co., 195 Pa. Super. 22, 168 A.2d 591 (1961); Sims v. South Carolina State
Comm'n of Forestry, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701 (1959); Cooper v. Venatieri, 73
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New York court, to "be assignable to something catastrophic or extraordinary."' 2 In 1950, however, after struggling for twenty-five years to distinguish between the "usual" and the "unusual" in the employment environment, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the following rule: "Whether
a particular event was an industrial accident is to be determined not by
any legal definition, but by the common-sense viewpoint of the average
man."13 Although interpretation of the "average man" test has varied, 14 it
appears that the unusualness requirement has been abandoned in New
York-at least where the claimant's injury involved a heart condition. 15 In
addition to unusualness, some courts have demanded that the injury be

assignable to a definite time and place. 16 Whether this means a definite
time and place of the cause of the injury or of the effect of the injury is,

however, a source of disagreement.17 Clearly, if definiteness of cause is
required, recovery for a heart attack resulting from stress and strain over

a protracted period would be severely restricted.
Where the employee's generalized condition is alleged to have resulted
from mental or emotional stress alone, another uncertainty of causation is
introduced, and New York along with a minority of states has denied recovery.' 8 These decisions may also come from an erroneous extension of the
"impact" doctrine of tort law.'19 New York, however, has been in the
S.D. 418, 43 N.W.2d 747 (1950); Kruse v. Department of Labor and Indus., 52 Wash.
2d 453, 326 P.2d 58 (1958).
12. Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334, 335 (1935).
13. Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 35, 92 N.E.2d 56, 57 (1950). In
this case, the court held that a heart injury was compensable even though the employee
had been engaged in his "daily work."
14. "Thousands of litigants have attempted their own interpretations of Chief Judge
Loughran's famous statement in Masse v. James H. Robinson Co ..... For myself, I
[T]here still must
cannot imagine any average man considering this an accident ....
be an 'industrial accident' in some real, objective sense. The Masse opinion itself
recites that the employee 'whose work had long been physically hard, was subjected
to unusual strain and exertion during his working hours in the week that ended April
15, 1947.' I do not think his claim would have been upheld on a showing that he
had been worrying more than usual." 176 N.E.2d at 718, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (dissenting opinion).
15. 1 LAsoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 38.64; Comment, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 322,
330-31 (1959).
16. 1 LA soN, op. cit. supranote 6, § 37.20.
17. Ibid.
18. Lesnik v. National Carloading Corp., 285 App. Div. 649, 140 N.Y.S.2d 907
(1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 958, 132 N.E.2d 326 (1956); Lewter v. Abercrombie Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954) (cashier died of cerebral hemorrhage
when excited by fire in theater); Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d
81 (1953) (employee suffered cerebral hemorrhage after questioning by police).
Contra, e.g., Firemen's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 241 P.2d 299
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952); Charon's Case,*
321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947); McClain v. Board of Educ., 30 N.J. 567, 154
A.2d 569 (1959).
19. "Surely if, in a negligence case, no causal relation can be found between an
accident and damages caused by pure fright, no such relation can be discovered,
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process of liberalizing its strict rules, granting recovery where the generalized condition was caused by a sudden emotional stress or where the physical exertion consisted only of working long hours over an extended period
of time. 20 But in Lesnik v. National CarloadingCorp. 21 an apparent outer
limit was reached. There recovery was denied for a heart attack resulting
from only emotional strain over an extended period of time.
In the instant case, the majority of the court cited the cases demonstrating the liberal trend 22 to show that New York had long since awarded
benefits for injuries which had no physical "impact" as a cause 2 3 The
court distinguished the instant case from Lesnik on the basis of the extent
to which the employees were coping with the very problems which caused
the emotional stress at the time of their respective heart attacks,24 and
because of the weakness of the medical proof in Lesnik as compared to the
"virtually conclusive nature" of the proof in the case at hand.2 5 The majority further stated that the heart attack would have been considered an
industrial accident by the "average man," and added, as -a final makeweight,
that its holding was supported by an ample number of decisions of other
states. 26 The principal arguments of the dissenting opinion were: first,
that the instant decision would make the application of workmen's compensation statutes limitless; second, that although the "average man" test dispensed with certain traditional requirements necessary for a compensable
"accident," it nonetheless stopped somewhere short of allowing recovery
when not supported by some observable, physical strain by the claimant;
-where the facts are the same, in a workmen's compensation case." Thompson v. City

of Binghamton, 218 App. Div. 451, 218 N.Y.S. 355, 358 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
"Grasping at the common law ruling that nervous shock without a flesh wound or
external trauma was not a basis of liability, insurance carriers fought to infuse the
same doctrine into compensation acts. Successful in a few states, they went down to
defeat in England and in most American jurisdictions." Honovrrz, WonyulN's CortPENSATION 75 (1944).
20. Anderson v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 275 App. Div. 1010, 91 N.Y.S.2d
710 (1949), motion for leave to appeal denied, 300 N.Y. 759, 90 N.E.2d 901 (1950);
Furtardo v. American Export Airlines, Inc., 274 App. Div. 954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1948),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 933, 83 N.E.2d 866 (1949); Pickerell v.
Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926); Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 278
App. Div. 731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1951); Church v. Westchester County, 253 App. Div.
859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938); Thompson v. City of Binghampton, 218 App. Div. 451,
218 N.Y. Supp. 355 (1926).
21. 285 App. Div. 649, 140 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 958, 132 N.E.2d
326 (1956).
22. See cases cited note 20 supra.
23. 176 N.E.2d at 716-17, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 16-18.
24. "Lesnik may be distinguished on the ground that the attack occurred while the
claimant was at rest-at the race track-while here 'even though the decedent was
sitting by a swimming pool he was still in the midst of the very problem, the strain
and tension of which the Board could [and did] find caused his attack."' Id. at 717,
219 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 717, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19.
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and third, that changes in well-established interpretations
of the Workmen's
27
Compensation Act should be left to the legislature.
Analysis of the instant case indicates that it is only a slight extension of
previous New York decisions, which based recovery on either sudden emotional stress or long hours of work over an extended period of time.28 In
Lesnik, however, the court had refused to award benefits on strikingly
similar facts2 9 to those in the case at hand. The distinction that Lesnik was
resting when his heart attack occurred while Klimas was still worrying
about his problems is not convincing.30 In both cases, the heart attack was
caused by employment conditions previous to the time of the attack and
not by some event occurring simultaneous to the injury. If the cases may
be distinguished at all, it is because of the strength of the medical proof
that the anxiety and worry were a cause of the heart attack in the instant
case as compared to the uncertain nature of the medical testimony in the
Lesnik case.31 If the controlling reason for awarding compensation benefits
in the case at hand was that the trier of fact could reasonably have inferred
that decedent's heart attack was caused by his work, it is a highly commendable decision. The basic reason for the workmen's compensation
statutes is to provide benefits to the victims of work-connected injuries.32
A few states, recognizing this reason, have frankly stated that proof of
medical connection between the work and the injury is all that is necessary for benefits to be awarded.3 Although the court of appeals refrained
from making a definite statement that compensation will depend upon
causation alone, the decision in the instant case strongly indicates that it is
the culmination of a progressive movement toward allowing recovery for
any heart attack when there is satisfactory proof of employment causation.
27. Id. at 718-19, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20.
28. See cases cited note 20 supra.
29. The employee had undergone emotional stress due to anxiety over the decreasing
revenues of his employer, but his heart attack occurred while he was attending a horse
race.
30. 1 LAnsoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 29.22.
31. 176 N.E.2d at 717, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
32. 1 LARsoN, op. cit. supranote 6, § 2.20.
33. Insurance Dep't v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691 (1958); Ciuba v.
Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).

